Mechanism Design for eliciting probabilistic estimates from multiple suppliers with unknown costs and limited precision
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- Papakonstantinou, A. & Rogers, A & Gerding, E. H. & Jennings, N. R., 2010. "Mechanism Design for the truthful elicitation of costly probabilistic estimates in Distributed Information Systems," MPRA Paper 43324, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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More about this item
Keywords
Mechanism Design; Auction Theory; Multi-agent Systems; Scoring Rules;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
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