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Value-Based Management and Corporate Governance: a Study of Serbian Corporations

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  • Stancic, Predrag
  • Todorovic, Miroslav
  • Cupic, Milan

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to determine the place and role of corporate governance and performance measures in the efforts of managers to maximize shareholder value, and the attitude of Serbian corporations toward these issues. The paper first analyses the importance of corporate governance and performance measures in the context of value-based management. Then, through the multiple case study, we investigate the attitude of seven Serbian corporations toward defining the general corporate objective, corporate governance, and performance measurement. Finally, we point out the factors and preconditions that determine corporate culture, objective definition, and performance measures used by Serbian corporations.

Suggested Citation

  • Stancic, Predrag & Todorovic, Miroslav & Cupic, Milan, 2012. "Value-Based Management and Corporate Governance: a Study of Serbian Corporations," MPRA Paper 42202, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:42202
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    Cited by:

    1. Mirjana Todorović & Milan Čupić & Dejan Jovanović, 2022. "Sustainable Lean Implementation: A Study Of Serbian Companies," Economic Annals, Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Belgrade, vol. 67(234), pages 81-108, July – Se.
    2. Riyad Neman Darwazeh & Mohammad Dabaghia, 2018. "Privatization Effect on Shareholder Value in the Jordanian State Owned Enterprises," International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues, Econjournals, vol. 8(2), pages 70-78.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    shareholder value; corporate governance; performance measures;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L25 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Performance
    • L21 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Business Objectives of the Firm
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill

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