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一般化Moran过程中的合作演化
[The Evolution of Cooperation in a Generalized Moran Process]

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  • Dai, Darong

Abstract

In this paper, infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma game as a benchmark being used to build a new model as the payoff matrix of an evolutionary game dynamics, with the comparative study of game performances between the behavior- pattern “tit for tat” and the behavior-pattern “always defection”, proving that there exists a strictly positive probability, which has a close link with the discount factor, that a single TFT individual can fully invade into a group of ALLD individuals; that is to say, TFT has some kind of evolutionary stability.

Suggested Citation

  • Dai, Darong, 2010. "一般化Moran过程中的合作演化 [The Evolution of Cooperation in a Generalized Moran Process]," MPRA Paper 40261, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:40261
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Alan Beggs, 2002. "Stochastic evolution with slow learning," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 19(2), pages 379-405.
    2. JÃrg Oechssler & Frank Riedel, 2001. "Evolutionary dynamics on infinite strategy spaces," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 17(1), pages 141-162.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    IPD; Evolutionary Game Dynamics; Equilibrium Selection;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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