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The sequential equal surplus division for sharing a river

Author

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  • Béal, Sylvain
  • Rémila, Eric
  • Solal, Philippe

Abstract

We introduce the sequential equal surplus division for sharing the total welfare resulting form the cooperation of agents along a river with a delta. This allocation rule can be seen as a generalization of the contribution vectors introduced by Ju, Borm and Ruys (2007) in the context of TU-games. We provide two axiomatic characterizations of the sequential equal surplus division.

Suggested Citation

  • Béal, Sylvain & Rémila, Eric & Solal, Philippe, 2012. "The sequential equal surplus division for sharing a river," MPRA Paper 37346, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:37346
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Lehrer, E, 1988. "An Axiomatization of the Banzhaf Value," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 17(2), pages 89-99.
    2. Yuan Ju & Peter Borm & Pieter Ruys, 2007. "The consensus value: a new solution concept for cooperative games," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 28(4), pages 685-703, June.
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    4. Erik Ansink & Hans-Peter Weikard, 2012. "Sequential sharing rules for river sharing problems," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 38(2), pages 187-210, February.
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    6. Yuan Ju & Peter Borm & Pieter Ruys, 2007. "The consensus value: a new solution concept for cooperative games," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 28(4), pages 685-703, June.
    7. Anna Khmelnitskaya, 2010. "Values for rooted-tree and sink-tree digraph games and sharing a river," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 69(4), pages 657-669, October.
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    10. William Thomson, 2011. "Consistency and its converse: an introduction," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 15(4), pages 257-291, December.
    11. Béal, Sylvain & Rémila, Eric & Solal, Philippe, 2010. "Rooted-tree solutions for tree games," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 203(2), pages 404-408, June.
    12. van den Brink, René & van der Laan, Gerard & Moes, Nigel, 2012. "Fair agreements for sharing international rivers with multiple springs and externalities," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 63(3), pages 388-403.
    13. Khmelnitskaya, A. & Talman, A.J.J., 2010. "Tree-Type Values for Cycle-Free Directed Graph Games," Discussion Paper 2010-113, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    14. Herings, P. Jean Jacques & van der Laan, Gerard & Talman, Dolf, 2008. "The average tree solution for cycle-free graph games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 77-92, January.
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    16. Béal, Sylvain & Rémila, Eric & Solal, Philippe, 2012. "Weighted component fairness for forest games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 144-151.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Erik Ansink & Harold Houba, 2014. "The Economics of Transboundary River Management," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 14-132/VIII, Tinbergen Institute.
    2. Erik Ansink & Hans-Peter Weikard, 2015. "Composition properties in the river claims problem," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 44(4), pages 807-831, April.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Amalgamation ; Consistency ; Fairness ; Sequential Equal Surplus Division ; Sharing a river;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • Q56 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environment and Development; Environment and Trade; Sustainability; Environmental Accounts and Accounting; Environmental Equity; Population Growth
    • Q25 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Water

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