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A Finnish - Soviet Acid Rain Game: Noncooperative Equilibria, Cost Efficiency, and Sulfur Agreements

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  • Tahvonen Olli
  • Kaitala Veijo
  • Pohjola Matti

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Tahvonen Olli & Kaitala Veijo & Pohjola Matti, 1993. "A Finnish - Soviet Acid Rain Game: Noncooperative Equilibria, Cost Efficiency, and Sulfur Agreements," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 87-100, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeeman:v:24:y:1993:i:1:p:87-100
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Kenji Fujiwara & Norimichi Matsueda, 2007. "An endogenous timing analysis of international duopoly with transboundary stock pollution," Discussion Paper Series 31, School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University, revised Apr 2007.
    2. Kenji Fujiwara & Norimichi Matsueda, 2009. "Effects of Transboundary Pollution on the Mode of International Trade of a Polluting Good," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 17(5), pages 1009-1018, November.
    3. Tae-Yeoun Lee, 2001. "Effects of Technology Transfers on the Provision of Public Goods," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 18(2), pages 193-218, February.
    4. Hutton, J P & Halkos, G E, 1995. "Optimal acid rain abatement policy for Europe: An analysis for the year 2000," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 259-275, October.
    5. Endres, Alfred, 1997. "Negotiating a climate convention: The role of prices and quantities," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 147-156, March.
    6. George Halkos, 1996. "Incomplete information in the acid rain game," Empirica, Springer;Austrian Institute for Economic Research;Austrian Economic Association, vol. 23(2), pages 129-148, June.
    7. Honkatukia, Juha & Ollikainen, Markku, 2001. "Towards Efficient Pollution Control in the Baltic Sea. An anatomy of current failure with suggestions," Discussion Papers 755, The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy.
    8. Halkos, George, 1994. "A game-theoretic approach to pollution control problems," MPRA Paper 33259, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Sudhir A. Shah, 2006. "A Non-Cooperative Theory Of Quantity-Rationing International Transfrontier Pollution," Working papers 143, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
    10. Kristen A. Sheeran, 2006. "Side Payments of Exceptions: The Implications for Equitable and Efficient Climate Control," Eastern Economic Journal, Eastern Economic Association, vol. 32(3), pages 515-532, Summer.
    11. Halkos, G.E., 1994. "Optimal acid rain abatement policy in Europe," MPRA Paper 33943, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    12. Rudolf Kerschbamer & Nina Maderner, 2001. "Optimal Control of Upstream Pollution under Asymmetric Information," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 19(4), pages 343-360, August.
    13. Flåm, Sjur Didrik, 2002. "Balanced Environmental Games," Working Papers in Economics 17/02, University of Bergen, Department of Economics.

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