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Antitrust and Copyright Collectives – an Economic Analysis

Author

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  • Zablocka, Adrianna

Abstract

The activity of the copyright collecting societies had been scrutinized by many antitrust authorities. The paper presents the decision taken by the President of the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection (UOKiK), which deals with abusing practices of Polish copyright collective society – ZAiKS. The paper concentrates on the economic aspects of the decision from the President of UOKiK.

Suggested Citation

  • Zablocka, Adrianna, 2008. "Antitrust and Copyright Collectives – an Economic Analysis," MPRA Paper 23987, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:23987
    as

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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/23987/1/MPRA_paper_23987.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    5. Hal R. Varian, 2005. "Copying and Copyright," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 19(2), pages 121-138, Spring.
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    collecting societies; copyright; antitrust; transaction costs; welfare;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law

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