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The performance of four possible rules for selecting the Prime Minister after the Dutch Parliamentary elections of June 2010

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  • Colignatus, Thomas

Abstract

Economic policy depends not only on national elections but also on coalition bargaining strategies. In coalition government, minority parties bargain on policy and form a majority coalition, and select a Prime Minister from their mids. In Holland the latter is done conventionally with Plurality, so that the largest party provides the chair of the cabinet. Alternative methods are Condorcet, Borda or Borda Fixed Point. Since the role of the Prime Minister is to be above all parties and represent the nation and to be there for all citizens, it would enhance democracy and likely be optimal if the potential Prime Minister is selected from all parties and at the start of the bargaining process. The performance of the four selection rules is evaluated using the results of the 2010 Dutch Parliamentary elections. The impossibility theorem by Kenneth Arrow (Nobel memorial prize in economics 1972) finds a crucially different interpretation.

Suggested Citation

  • Colignatus, Thomas, 2010. "The performance of four possible rules for selecting the Prime Minister after the Dutch Parliamentary elections of June 2010," MPRA Paper 23240, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 19 May 2010.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:23240
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Saari,Donald G., 2001. "Decisions and Elections," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521808163, September.
    2. Colignatus, Thomas, 2010. "Single vote multiple seats elections. Didactics of district versus proportional representation, using the examples of the United Kingdom and The Netherlands," MPRA Paper 22671, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 06 Jul 2007.
    3. Thomas Colignatus, 2005. ""Approval Voting" lacks a sound moral base for the individual voter's choice of approval versus non-approval, especially when the Status Quo is neglected," General Economics and Teaching 0503014, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Saari,Donald G., 2001. "Decisions and Elections," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521004046, September.
    5. Thomas Cool, 2002. "Without time, no morality," General Economics and Teaching 0202003, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 17 Feb 2002.
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    Cited by:

    1. Colignatus, Thomas, 2017. "The performance of four possible rules for selecting the Prime Minister after the Dutch Parliamentary elections of March 2017," MPRA Paper 77616, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 17 Mar 2017.
    2. Colignatus, Thomas, 2013. "The performance of four possible rules for selecting the Prime Minister after the Dutch Parliamentary elections of September 2012," MPRA Paper 44158, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 02 Feb 2013.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Political economy; public choice; political science; optimal representation; electoral systems; elections; coalition; impossibility theorem;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • C88 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Data Collection and Data Estimation Methodology; Computer Programs - - - Other Computer Software
    • A2 - General Economics and Teaching - - Economic Education and Teaching of Economics

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