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An understanding of influence on human behavior

Author

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  • Popp, Alexandru W. A.

Abstract

We describe a candid model for learning, why and how learning transpires. We investigate the original as well as the leading conditions of the learning process. We provide an insight into the realm of beliefs and their formation, their interaction and influence with the actor’s environment. In addition, we provide to our terms (and terminology) real definitions, thus differentiating between nominal and real definitions. Having this approach, the same terminology can be employed by other models, theories or frameworks without creating ‘expert language’ barriers. Moreover, we provide an understanding of the influence that learning in general has on human behavior.

Suggested Citation

  • Popp, Alexandru W. A., 2009. "An understanding of influence on human behavior," MPRA Paper 17367, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:17367
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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/17367/1/MPRA_paper_17367.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Bernheim, B Douglas, 1984. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1007-1028, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Popp, Alexandru W. A., 2009. "Efficient coalition formation and stable coalition structures in a supply chain environment," MPRA Paper 18277, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    conceptual conglomerate; learning; learning process; human behavior.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C79 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Other
    • C99 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Other
    • Z19 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Other
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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