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The environmental effect of ambient charges in mixed triopoly with diverse firm objectives

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  • Ohnishi, Kazuhiro

Abstract

This paper examines a quantity-setting mixed triopoly model comprising a profit-maximizing firm, a partially cooperating firm and a socially concerned firm to reassess the environmental effect of an increase in ambient charges. The paper demonstrates that an increase in the ambient charge can reduce pollutant emissions.

Suggested Citation

  • Ohnishi, Kazuhiro, 2021. "The environmental effect of ambient charges in mixed triopoly with diverse firm objectives," MPRA Paper 108521, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:108521
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    2. Xepapadeas, A. P., 1995. "Observability and choice of instrument mix in the control of externalities," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(3), pages 485-498, March.
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    4. Kopel, Michael & Brand, Björn, 2012. "Socially responsible firms and endogenous choice of strategic incentives," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 982-989.
    5. Ohnishi, Kazuhiro, 2021. "Pollution, partial privatization and the effect of ambient charges," MPRA Paper 106319, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Xepapadeas, A. P., 1991. "Environmental policy under imperfect information: Incentives and moral hazard," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 113-126, March.
    7. Cyert, Richard M & DeGroot, Morris H, 1973. "An Analysis of Cooperation and Learning in a Duopoly Context," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 63(1), pages 24-37, March.
    8. Sabri Boubaker & Duc Khuong Nguyen (ed.), 2012. "Board Directors and Corporate Social Responsibility," Palgrave Macmillan Books, Palgrave Macmillan, number 978-0-230-38930-4.
    9. Kazuhiro Ohnishi, 2010. "Lifetime Employment Contract and Quantity Competition with Profit-Maximizing and Joint-Stock Firms," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 166(3), pages 462-478, September.
    10. Matsumoto, Akio & Merlone, Ugo & Szidarovszky, Ferenc, 2010. "Dynamic oligopoly with partial cooperation and antitrust threshold," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 259-272, February.
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    12. Suter, Jordan F. & Vossler, Christian A. & Poe, Gregory L. & Segerson, Kathleen, 2008. "AJAE Appendix: Experiments on Damage-Based Ambient Taxes for Nonpoint Source Polluters," American Journal of Agricultural Economics APPENDICES, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 90(1), pages 1-14, February.
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    14. Arturo García & Mariel Leal & Sang-Ho Lee, 2019. "Endogenous Timing with a Socially Responsible Firm," Korean Economic Review, Korean Economic Association, vol. 35, pages 345-370.
    15. Leonard F.S. Wang & Jen-yao Lee, 2010. "Partial Privatization, Foreign Competition, and Tariffs Ranking," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 30(3), pages 2405-2412.
    16. Hideki Sato, 2017. "Pollution from Cournot duopoly industry and the effect of ambient charges," Journal of Environmental Economics and Policy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 6(3), pages 305-308, July.
    17. Jordan F. Suter & Christian A. Vossler & Gregory L. Poe & Kathleen Segerson, 2008. "Experiments on Damage-Based Ambient Taxes for Nonpoint Source Polluters," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 90(1), pages 86-102.
    18. Michael Kopel, 2015. "Price and Quantity Contracts in a Mixed Duopoly with a Socially Concerned Firm," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 36(8), pages 559-566, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Ohnishi, Kazuhiro, 2024. "Pollution, partial privatization and the effect of ambient charges: price competition," MPRA Paper 120531, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    ambient charge; Cournot triopoly; partially cooperating firm; pollution; socially concerned firm;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
    • Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy

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