Multiple receptor ambient monitoring and firm compliance with environmental taxes under budget and target driven regulatory missions
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2012.03.002
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
- Spraggon, John, 2002.
"Exogenous targeting instruments as a solution to group moral hazards,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(3), pages 427-456, June.
- John Spraggon, 1998. "Exogenous Targeting Instruments as a Solution to Group Moral Hazards," Department of Economics Working Papers 1998-01, McMaster University.
- James S. Shortle & Richard D. Horan, 2001. "The Economics of Nonpoint Pollution Control," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(3), pages 255-289, July.
- Macho-Stadler, Ines & Perez-Castrillo, David, 2006.
"Optimal enforcement policy and firms' emissions and compliance with environmental taxes,"
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 110-131, January.
- Ines Macho-Stadler & David Pérez-Castrillo, 2004. "Optimal Enforcement Policy and Firms’ Emissions and Compliance with Environmental Taxes," CESifo Working Paper Series 1193, CESifo.
- Inés Macho-Stadler & David Pérez-Castrillo, 2004. "Optimal Enforcement Policy and Firms' Emissions and Compliance with Environmental Taxes," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 612.04, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- David Pérez-Castrillo & Inés Macho-Stadler, 2015. "Optimal Enforcement Policy and Firm's Emissions and Compliance with Environmental Taxes," Working Papers 124, Barcelona School of Economics.
- François Cochard & Marc Willinger & Anastasios Xepapadeas, 2005.
"Efficiency of Nonpoint Source Pollution Instruments: An Experimental Study,"
Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 30(4), pages 393-422, April.
- Francois Cochard & Marc Willinger & Anastasios Xepapadeas, 2005. "Efficiency of nonpoint source pollution instruments: an experimental study," Post-Print hal-02680148, HAL.
- Francois Cochard & Marc Willinger & Anastasios Xepapadeas, 2005. "Efficiency of Nonpoint Source Pollution Instruments : An Experimental Study," Post-Print hal-00279148, HAL.
- Herriges Joseph A. & Govindasamy Ramu & Shogren Jason F., 1994.
"Budget-Balancing Incentive Mechanisms,"
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 275-285, November.
- Joseph A. Herriges & Ramu Govindasamy & Jason F. Shogren, 1992. "Budget Balancing Incentive Mechanisms," Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) Publications 92-wp100, Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) at Iowa State University.
- Herriges, Joseph A. & Shogren, Jason F. & Govindasamy, R., 1994. "Budget Balancing Incentive Mechanisms," Staff General Research Papers Archive 1503, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- Franckx, Laurent, 2002. "The Use of Ambient Inspections in Environmental Monitoring and Enforcement When the Inspection Agency Cannot Commit Itself to Announced Inspection Probabilities," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 71-92, January.
- Laurent Franckx, 2005.
"Environmental Enforcement with Endogenous Ambient Monitoring,"
Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 30(2), pages 195-220, February.
- Laurent Franckx, 2001. "Environmental enforcement with endogenous ambient monitoring," Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series ete0115, KU Leuven, Department of Economics - Research Group Energy, Transport and Environment.
- Horan, Richard D. & Shortle, James S. & Abler, David G., 1998. "Ambient Taxes When Polluters Have Multiple Choices," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 186-199, September.
- Segerson, Kathleen, 1988.
"Uncertainty and incentives for nonpoint pollution control,"
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 87-98, March.
- Segerson, Kathleen, 1985. "Uncertainty And Incentives For Nonpoint Pollution Control," 1985 Annual Meeting, August 4-7, Ames, Iowa 278615, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
- Xepapadeas, A. P., 1992. "Environmental policy design and dynamic nonpoint-source pollution," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 22-39, July.
- Francisco Alpízar & Till Requate & Albert Schram, 2004. "Collective versus Random Fining: An Experimental Study on Controlling Ambient Pollution," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 29(2), pages 231-252, October.
- Franckx Laurent, 2002. "Ambient environmental inspections and commitment towards enforcement policies: substitutes or complements?," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 2(1), pages 1-20, January.
- Xepapadeas, A. P., 1991. "Environmental policy under imperfect information: Incentives and moral hazard," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 113-126, March.
- Christian A. Vossler & Gregory L. Poe & William D. Schulze & Kathleen Segerson, 2006. "Communication and Incentive Mechanisms Based on Group Performance: An Experimental Study of Nonpoint Pollution Control," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 44(4), pages 599-613, October.
- Laurent Franckx, 2004. "Marginal Deterrence Through Ambient Environmental Inspections," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 51(4), pages 507-527, September.
- Laurent Franckx, 2001. "Ambient environmental monitoring, sequential firm inspections and time-decreasing benefits of inspection," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 17(1), pages 1-10.
- Cabe, Richard & Herriges, Joseph A., 1992. "The regulation of non-point-source pollution under imperfect and asymmetric information," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 134-146, March.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Miloš Fišar & Ondřej Krčál & Jiří Špalek & Rostislav Staněk & James Tremewan, 2019. "A Competitive Audit Selection Mechanism with Incomplete Information," MUNI ECON Working Papers 2019-08, Masaryk University, revised Feb 2023.
- Barinova, Vera (Баринова, Вера) & Eremkin, V.A. (Еремкин, В.А.) & Lanshina, T.A. (Ланьшина, Т.А.), 2017. "Analysis of the Essence of Control and Supervisory Activities in Russia and Abroad [Анализ Сущности Контрольно-Надзорной Деятельности В России И За Рубежом]," Working Papers 051722, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration.
- Oestreich, Andreas Marcel, 2017. "On optimal audit mechanisms for environmental taxes," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 62-83.
- Andreas Oestreich, 2015. "Firms’ Emissions and Self-Reporting Under Competitive Audit Mechanisms," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 62(4), pages 949-978, December.
- Dongryul Lee & Kyung Hwan Baik, 2017. "Concealment and verification over environmental regulations: a game-theoretic analysis," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 51(3), pages 235-268, June.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Anastasios Xepapadeas, 2011.
"The Economics of Non-Point-Source Pollution,"
Annual Review of Resource Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 3(1), pages 355-373, October.
- Anastasios Xepapadeas, 2012. "The Economics of Nonpoint Source Pollution," DEOS Working Papers 1233, Athens University of Economics and Business.
- Suter, Jordan F. & Vossler, Christian A. & Poe, Gregory L., 2009. "Ambient-based pollution mechanisms: A comparison of homogeneous and heterogeneous groups of emitters," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(6), pages 1883-1892, April.
- Camacho-Cuena, Eva & Requate, Till, 2012. "The regulation of non-point source pollution and risk preferences: An experimental approach," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(C), pages 179-187.
- Marc Willinger & Nasreddine Ammar & Ahmed Ennasri, 2014.
"Performance of the Ambient Tax: Does the Nature of the Damage Matter?,"
Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 59(3), pages 479-502, November.
- Nasreddine AMMAR & Ahmed ENNASRI & Marc Willinger, 2011. "Performance of the ambient tax: does the nature of the damage matter?," Working Papers 11-25, LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier, revised Dec 2011.
- Gaston Giordana & Marc Willinger, 2013. "Regulatory instruments for monitoring ambient pollution," Chapters, in: John A. List & Michael K. Price (ed.), Handbook on Experimental Economics and the Environment, chapter 7, pages 193-232, Edward Elgar Publishing.
- COCHARD François & ROZAN Anne & SPAETER Sandrine, 2006.
"Prevention and Compensation of Muddy Flows: Some Economic Insights,"
LERNA Working Papers
06.24.217, LERNA, University of Toulouse.
- Sandrine Spaeter & François Cochard & Anne Rozan, 2006. "Prevention and Compensation of Muddy Flows: Some Economic Insights," Working Papers of BETA 2006-29, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
- François Cochard & Marc Willinger & Anastasios Xepapadeas, 2005.
"Efficiency of Nonpoint Source Pollution Instruments: An Experimental Study,"
Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 30(4), pages 393-422, April.
- Francois Cochard & Marc Willinger & Anastasios Xepapadeas, 2005. "Efficiency of nonpoint source pollution instruments: an experimental study," Post-Print hal-02680148, HAL.
- Francois Cochard & Marc Willinger & Anastasios Xepapadeas, 2005. "Efficiency of Nonpoint Source Pollution Instruments : An Experimental Study," Post-Print hal-00279148, HAL.
- Christian A. Vossler & Gregory L. Poe & William D. Schulze & Kathleen Segerson, 2006. "Communication and Incentive Mechanisms Based on Group Performance: An Experimental Study of Nonpoint Pollution Control," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 44(4), pages 599-613, October.
- François Cochard & Julie Le Gallo & Laurent Franckx, 2015. "Regulation Of Pollution In The Laboratory: Random Inspections, Ambient Inspections, And Commitment Problems," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(S1), pages 40-73, December.
- Vossler, Christian A. & Poe, Gregory L. & Schulze, William D. & Segerson, Kathleen, 2002. "An Experimental Test of Ambient-Based Mechanisms for Nonpoint Source Pollution Control," Working Papers 127334, Cornell University, Department of Applied Economics and Management.
- James Shortle & Richard D. Horan, 2013. "Policy Instruments for Water Quality Protection," Annual Review of Resource Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 5(1), pages 111-138, June.
- Mourad Ali & Patrick Rio, 2009. "Deterrence vs. Efficiency To Regulate Nonpoint Source Pollution," Working Papers 09-22, LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier, revised Dec 2009.
- Wu, Shang & Palm-Forster, Leah H. & Messer, Kent D., 2021. "Impact of peer comparisons and firm heterogeneity on nonpoint source water pollution: An experimental study," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
- Suter, Jordan F. & Vossler, Christian A. & Poe, Gregory L. & Schulze, William D. & Segerson, Kathleen, 2006. "An Experimental Exploration of a Voluntary Mechanism to Reduce Nonpoint Source Water Pollution with a Background Threat of Regulation," 2006 Annual meeting, July 23-26, Long Beach, CA 21416, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
- Camacho Cuena, Eva & Requate, Till, 2004. "Collective and Random Fining versus Tax/Subsidy - Schemes to Regulate Non-Point Pollution: An Experimental Study," Economics Working Papers 2004-10, Christian-Albrechts-University of Kiel, Department of Economics.
- Larry Karp, 2005.
"Nonpoint Source Pollution Taxes and Excessive Tax Burden,"
Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 31(2), pages 229-251, June.
- Karp, Larry S., 1998. "Nonpoint Source Pollution Taxes and Excessive Tax Burden," CUDARE Working Papers 25100, University of California, Berkeley, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics.
- Karp, Larry, 2005. "Nonpoint source pollution taxes and excessive tax burden," Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series qt8364p7br, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley.
- Karp, Larry, 1998. "Nonpoint Source Pollution Taxes and Excessive Tax Burden," Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series qt4z62b52k, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley.
- Jones, Kristin Roti & Corona, Joel P., 2008. "An ambient tax approach to invasive species," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(3), pages 534-541, January.
- Dijkstra, Bouwe R. & Rübbelke, Dirk T.G., 2013.
"Group rewards and individual sanctions in environmental policy,"
Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 38-59.
- Bouwe R. Dijkstra & Dirk T.G. Rübbelke, 2007. "Group Rewards and Individual Sanctions in Environmental Policy," Working Papers 2007.44, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Dijkstra, Bouwe R. & Rubbelke, Dirk T.G., 2007. "Group Rewards and Individual Sanctions in Environmental Policy," Economic Theory and Applications Working Papers 9333, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
- Bouwe R. Dijkstra & Dirk T.G. Rübbelke, 2007. "Group rewards and individual sanctions in environmental policy," Discussion Papers 07/01, University of Nottingham, School of Economics.
- Richard Horan & James Shortle & David Abler, 2002. "Ambient Taxes Under m-Dimensional Choice Sets, Heterogeneous Expectations, and Risk-Aversion," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 21(2), pages 189-202, February.
- Segerson, Kathleen & Wu, JunJie, 2006.
"Nonpoint pollution control: Inducing first-best outcomes through the use of threats,"
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 165-184, March.
- Kathleen Segerson & JunJie Wu, 2003. "Nonpoint Pollution Control: Inducing First-best Outcomes through the Use of Threats," Working papers 2003-03, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics, revised Aug 2004.
More about this item
Keywords
Ambient monitoring; Auditing policy; Environmental enforcement; Environmental tax; Regulatory mission;All these keywords.
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jeeman:v:64:y:2012:i:3:p:390-401. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622870 .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.