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Partial Privatization, Foreign Competition, and Tariffs Ranking

Author

Listed:
  • Leonard F.S. Wang

    (Department of Applied Economics, National University of Kaohsiung)

  • Jen-yao Lee

    (Department of International Business, National Kaohsiung University of Applied Science)

Abstract

This paper compares the optimal tariff and revenue maximizing tariffs in the presence of partial privatization. We show that in an international mixed oligopoly with asymmetric costs and partial privatization, when the marginal cost of the privatized firm exceeds a critical value, maximum -revenue tariff is higher than optimum-welfare tariff. Otherwise, optimum-welfare tariff is higher than maximum-revenue tariff. In addition, associating with the market-opening policy, the domestic government should accelerate privatization path and impose a lower welfare-optimum tariff rate.

Suggested Citation

  • Leonard F.S. Wang & Jen-yao Lee, 2010. "Partial Privatization, Foreign Competition, and Tariffs Ranking," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 30(3), pages 2405-2412.
    • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-10-00423
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    File URL: http://www.accessecon.com/Pubs/EB/2010/Volume30/EB-10-V30-I3-P220.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. de Fraja, Giovanni & Delbono, Flavio, 1989. "Alternative Strategies of a Public Enterprise in Oligopoly," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 41(2), pages 302-311, April.
    2. Ngo Van Long & Frank Stähler, 2009. "Trade policy and mixed enterprises," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 42(2), pages 590-614, May.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Ohnishi, Kazuhiro, 2020. "Price-setting mixed duopoly, partial privatisation and subsidisation," MPRA Paper 104063, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Shih-shen Chen & Chu-Chuan Hsu & Chin-shu Huang, 2013. "Lobbying, corruption and “optimal” tariff," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 60(4), pages 375-386, December.
    3. Leonard Wang & Jen-yao Lee & Chin-shu Huang, 2012. "Maximum-Revenue and Optimum-Welfare Tariffs in International Mixed Duopoly: Does the Order of Firms’ Move Matter?," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 12(3), pages 273-283, September.
    4. Ohnishi, Kazuhiro, 2021. "Pollution, partial privatization and the effect of ambient charges," MPRA Paper 106319, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Ohnishi, Kazuhiro, 2024. "Pollution, partial privatization and the effect of ambient charges: price competition," MPRA Paper 120531, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Ohnishi, Kazuhiro, 2018. "Inventory Holding and a Mixed Duopoly with a Foreign Joint-Stock Firm," MPRA Paper 88223, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Ohnishi, Kazuhiro, 2021. "The environmental effect of ambient charges in mixed triopoly with diverse firm objectives," MPRA Paper 108521, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Kazuhiro Ohnishi, 2022. "Lifetime Employment and Stackelberg Mixed Duopoly Games with a Foreign Labour-Managed Competitor," Arthaniti: Journal of Economic Theory and Practice, , vol. 21(1), pages 27-42, June.
    9. Ohnishi, Kazuhiro, 2021. "Pollution, partial privatization and the effect of ambient charges," MPRA Paper 109592, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 04 Sep 2021.
    10. Wang, Leonard F.S. & Lee, Jen-yao, 2014. "Ranking the optimum tariff and the maximum revenue tariff in vertically related markets," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(3), pages 222-229.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    mixed oligopoly; partial privatization; tariff ranking;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F1 - International Economics - - Trade
    • L2 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior

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