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A Measure For Contestedness Of A Two-Person Bargaining Problem

Author

Listed:
  • Claus-Jochen Haake

    (Paderborn University)

  • Thomas Streck

    (Paderborn University)

Abstract

We consider two-person bargaining problems and provide axioms for a mapping that assigns to each bargaining problem a number in the unit interval that reflects how hard it is to find an agreement. We term this notion the contestedness of a bargaining problem and show that there is one and only one mapping satisfying the axioms. Furthermore, the axioms are shown to be logically independent. The mapping is based on the standard traveling time used in Perles and Maschler (1981) to define the bargaining solution therein.

Suggested Citation

  • Claus-Jochen Haake & Thomas Streck, 2024. "A Measure For Contestedness Of A Two-Person Bargaining Problem," Working Papers CIE 160, Paderborn University, CIE Center for International Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:pdn:ciepap:160
    as

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    File URL: http://groups.uni-paderborn.de/wp-wiwi/RePEc/pdf/ciepap/WP160.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Colin F. Camerer & Gideon Nave & Alec Smith, 2019. "Dynamic Unstructured Bargaining with Private Information: Theory, Experiment, and Outcome Prediction via Machine Learning," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 65(4), pages 1867-1890, April.
    2. Subrato Banerjee, 2020. "Correction to: Effect of reduced opportunities on bargaining outcomes: an experiment with status asymmetries," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 89(3), pages 347-347, October.
    3. Subrato Banerjee, 2020. "Effect of reduced opportunities on bargaining outcomes: an experiment with status asymmetries," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 89(3), pages 313-346, October.
    4. William Thomson, 2023. "The Axiomatics of Economic Design, Vol. 1," Studies in Choice and Welfare, Springer, number 978-3-031-29398-6, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bargaining Problem; Contestedness; Perles-Maschler bargaining solutio;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

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