Political Agency and Legislative Subsidies with Imperfect Monitoring
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DOI: 10.31219/osf.io/ydfbs
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References listed on IDEAS
- Prato, Carlo & Wolton, Stephane, 2013. "Rational Ignorance, Elections, and Reform," MPRA Paper 68638, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 10 Dec 2015.
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- Ellis, Christopher J. & Groll, Thomas, 2020. "Strategic Legislative Subsidies: Informational Lobbying and the Cost of Policy," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 114(1), pages 179-205, February.
- Ashworth, Scott & Bueno De Mesquita, Ethan, 2014. "Is Voter Competence Good for Voters?: Information, Rationality, and Democratic Performance," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 108(3), pages 565-587, August.
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NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CDM-2021-04-12 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-POL-2021-04-12 (Positive Political Economics)
- NEP-PPM-2021-04-12 (Project, Program and Portfolio Management)
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