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Strategic Legislative Subsidies: Informational Lobbying and the Cost of Policy

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  • ELLIS, CHRISTOPHER J.
  • GROLL, THOMAS

Abstract

We analyze the strategic considerations inherent in legislative subsidies and develop an informational lobbying model with costly policy reforms. In contrast to other models of informational lobbying, we focus on the implications of a policymaker’s and a lobby’s resource constraints for lobbying activities. We allow both a policymaker and a lobby to gather information, and each can either fund or subsidize policymaking. Our analysis highlights that legislative subsidies are both chosen strategically by lobbyists and strategically induced by policymakers, dependent on the circumstances. These involve which resource constraints bind the policymaker’s prior beliefs, the salience of policy, and the policymaker’s and lobby’s expertise in information gathering. Our results highlight five distinct motives for informational lobbying and demonstrate that for both a lobby and policymaker, there can be strategic advantages arising from being resource-constrained.

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  • Ellis, Christopher J. & Groll, Thomas, 2020. "Strategic Legislative Subsidies: Informational Lobbying and the Cost of Policy," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 114(1), pages 179-205, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:114:y:2020:i:1:p:179-205_13
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    Cited by:

    1. Schnakenberg, Keith & Turner, Ian R, 2023. "Formal Theories of Special Interest Influence," SocArXiv 47e26, Center for Open Science.
    2. Stefano Barbieri & Kai A. Konrad & David A. Malueg, 2020. "Preemption contests between groups," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 51(3), pages 934-961, September.
    3. Fehrler, Sebastian & Schneider, Maik T., 2021. "Buying supermajorities in the lab," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 127(C), pages 113-154.
    4. Hye Young You, 2023. "Dynamic lobbying: Evidence from foreign lobbying in the U.S. Congress," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(2), pages 445-469, July.
    5. Zerbini, Antoine, 2023. "The Case for Lobbying Transparency," SocArXiv w6vam, Center for Open Science.
    6. Schnakenberg, Keith & Schumock, Collin & Turner, Ian R, 2023. "Dark Money and Voter Learning," SocArXiv r562d, Center for Open Science.
    7. Thomas Groll & Christopher J. Ellis, 2017. "Repeated Lobbying By Commercial Lobbyists And Special Interests," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 55(4), pages 1868-1897, October.
    8. Christopher J. Ellis & Thomas Groll, 2018. "Who Lobbies Whom? Special Interests and Hired Guns," CESifo Working Paper Series 7367, CESifo.
    9. Schnakenberg, Keith & Turner, Ian R, 2019. "Signaling with Reform: How the Threat of Corruption Prevents Informed Policymaking," SocArXiv jkvz6, Center for Open Science.
    10. Blumenthal, Benjamin, 2021. "Political Agency and Legislative Subsidies with Imperfect Monitoring," SocArXiv ydfbs, Center for Open Science.
    11. Clement Minaudier, 2022. "The Value of Confidential Policy Information: Persuasion, Transparency, and Influence," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 38(2), pages 570-612.
    12. Dellis, Arnaud, 2023. "Legislative informational lobbying," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 208(C).

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