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How Political Culture Shapes Horizontal Accountability Outcomes: Evidence from 62 Countries

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  • Tomic, Slobodan
  • Rauh, William Jonathan

Abstract

Despite omnipresence of oversight bodies, they operate with varying levels of success across countries. Systemic studies of performance of oversight bodies are rare and most with positive findings have been conducted within single countries and operate under neo-institutionalist paradigms. In this study we propose ways in which political culture mediates the effectiveness of oversight bodies. Using data from 62 countries we develop a series of grouped time series models to examine how established measures of political culture affect horizontal accountability. The findings suggest a strong relationship between culture and the effectiveness of horizontal accountability institutions.

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  • Tomic, Slobodan & Rauh, William Jonathan, 2023. "How Political Culture Shapes Horizontal Accountability Outcomes: Evidence from 62 Countries," SocArXiv uf3nw, Center for Open Science.
    • Handle: RePEc:osf:socarx:uf3nw
    DOI: 10.31219/osf.io/uf3nw
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