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Does Crime Matter? The Politics of Crime Prevention in Colombia

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  • Gelvez, Juan David

    (University of Maryland)

Abstract

Why do governments prevent crime in some places and not others? Who are the primary beneficiaries of the security provision? This paper examines how the incumbent uses crime prevention projects as a pork-barrel good, in order to finance swing-voter municipalities. Using a mixed-method approach, which includes the analysis of a granular dataset of crime prevention funds and interviews with policymakers and bureaucrats, I study how electoral incentives can explain differences in security provision in Colombia. To do so, I conduct several fixed effect models and a regression discontinuity design that measures the effects of electoral results on money distribution, taking advantage of party alignment and margin of victory. I also interviewed policymakers and bureaucrats to shed light on the mechanisms behind these results. My study suggests that electoral competition, party alignment between national and local politicians, and the minister’s interest play pivotal roles in shaping security provisions across the country

Suggested Citation

  • Gelvez, Juan David, 2024. "Does Crime Matter? The Politics of Crime Prevention in Colombia," OSF Preprints znyq5, Center for Open Science.
    • Handle: RePEc:osf:osfxxx:znyq5
    DOI: 10.31219/osf.io/znyq5
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    References listed on IDEAS

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