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Sievert (2023): The Limited Impact of Reference Groups’ Symbolic Gender Representation on Willingness to Coproduce

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  • Sievert, Martin

    (University of Mannheim)

Abstract

Previous literature presents a strong rationale for the positive impact of symbolic representation in coproduction contexts. However, empirical studies yield inconclusive findings indicating that meaningful effects are limited if citizens face high levels of uncertainty. This article combines symbolic representation with signaling theory, suggesting that the representativeness of central reference groups might reduce uncertainty. The theoretical framework suggests that the representation of supervisors and existing coproducers might positively affect citizens’ willingness to coproduce. Contrary to the theoretical expectations, the empirical results from two preregistered factorial survey experiments (n = 2,979), situated in prisoner rehabilitation and refugee integration, indicate that the symbolic gender representation of these reference groups has a limited impact. Only a balanced representation of coproducers exhibits a positive treatment effect on citizens’ willingness to coproduce. The results oppose central arguments in the representative bureaucracy literature. At least for gender categories, symbolic representation is less important than expected.

Suggested Citation

  • Sievert, Martin, 2023. "Sievert (2023): The Limited Impact of Reference Groups’ Symbolic Gender Representation on Willingness to Coproduce," OSF Preprints r2s95, Center for Open Science.
    • Handle: RePEc:osf:osfxxx:r2s95
    DOI: 10.31219/osf.io/r2s95
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    4. Laura Doornkamp & Petra Van den Bekerom & Sandra Groeneveld, 2019. "The individual level effect of symbolic representation: An experimental study on teacher-student gender congruence and students’ perceived abilities in math," Journal of Behavioral Public Administration, Center for Experimental and Behavioral Public Administration, vol. 2(2).
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