IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/osf/lawarx/jksyp.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Getting it right the first time: Financial penalties to improve disability benefit assessments

Author

Listed:
  • Odell, Evan

Abstract

This paper explores the problem of low accuracy in disability benefit assessments, using the UK as an example. The UK's disability benefits system has been subject to substantial reforms in the previous decade, and continues to be in flux. I suggest the introduction of financial incentives to shift the assessment process towards treating claimants' statements at face value (and running the risk of false positives), away from the current practice of treating all claimants with scepticism (and running the risk of false negatives).

Suggested Citation

  • Odell, Evan, 2020. "Getting it right the first time: Financial penalties to improve disability benefit assessments," LawArXiv jksyp, Center for Open Science.
    • Handle: RePEc:osf:lawarx:jksyp
    DOI: 10.31219/osf.io/jksyp
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://osf.io/download/5ed277feaeeb6d03af08ceef/
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.31219/osf.io/jksyp?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Hugo Benitez-Silva & Moshe Buchinsky & John Rust, 2004. "How Large are the Classification Errors in the Social Security Disability Award Process?," NBER Working Papers 10219, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Tobias Laun, 2020. "Optimal Social Insurance with Endogenous Health," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 122(2), pages 464-493, April.
    2. Delia Furtado & Nikolaos Theodoropoulos, 2012. "Immigrant Networks and the Take-Up of Disability Programs: Evidence from US Census Data," University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics 09-2012, University of Cyprus Department of Economics.
    3. Liebert, Helge, 2019. "Does external medical review reduce disability insurance inflow?," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 108-128.
    4. Hugo Benítez-Silva & Richard Disney & Sergi Jiménez-Martín, 2010. "Disability, capacity for work and the business cycle: an international perspective [Has the boom in incapacity benefit claimant numbers passed its peak?]," Economic Policy, CEPR, CESifo, Sciences Po;CES;MSH, vol. 25(63), pages 483-536.
    5. Laurence Jacquet, 2014. "Tagging and redistributive taxation with imperfect disability monitoring," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 42(2), pages 403-435, February.
    6. Johanna Wallenius & Tobias Laun, 2013. "The Role of Social Insurance Programs in Accounting for Cross-Country Differences in Retirement Behavior," 2013 Meeting Papers 221, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    7. Xiaoyan Li & Nicole Maestas, 2008. "Does the Rise in the Full Retirement Age Encourage Disability Benefits Applications? Evidence from the Health and Retirement Study," Working Papers wp198, University of Michigan, Michigan Retirement Research Center.
    8. Tobias Laun & Johanna Wallenius, 2016. "Social Insurance and Retirement: A Cross-Country Perspective," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 22, pages 72-92, October.
    9. Hamish Low & Luigi Pistaferri, 2010. "Disability risk, disability insurance and life cycle behavior," IFS Working Papers W10/11, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
    10. Louis Kaplow, 2007. "Optimal income transfers," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 14(3), pages 295-325, June.
    11. Mathilde Godard & Pierre Koning & Maarten Lindeboom, 2024. "Application and Award Responses to Stricter Screening in Disability Insurance," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 59(5), pages 1353-1386.
    12. Bas van der Klaauw & Sandra Vriend, 2015. "A Nonparametric Method for Predicting Survival Probabilities," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 15-126/V, Tinbergen Institute.
    13. Lawson, Nicholas, 2015. "Social program substitution and optimal policy," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 13-27.
    14. Hamish Low & Luigi Pistaferri, 2020. "Disability Insurance: Theoretical Trade‐Offs and Empirical Evidence," Fiscal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 41(1), pages 129-164, March.
    15. Per Johansson & Per Skedinger, 2009. "Misreporting in register data on disability status: evidence from the Swedish Public Employment Service," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 37(2), pages 411-434, October.
    16. Janet Currie & Firouz Gahvari, 2008. "Transfers in Cash and In-Kind: Theory Meets the Data," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 46(2), pages 333-383, June.
    17. Rehn, Eric, 2007. "Imperfect Tagging Revisited," Working Papers 2007:2, Lund University, Department of Economics.
    18. Hamish Low & Luigi Pistaferri, 2019. "Disability Insurance: Error Rates and Gender Differences," Economics Series Working Papers 889, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    19. Jody Schimmel & David C. Stapleton, 2010. "Protecting the Household Incomes of Older Workers with Significant Health-Related Work Limitations in an Era of Fiscal Responsibility," Working Papers wp244, University of Michigan, Michigan Retirement Research Center.
    20. Mikhail Golosov & Aleh Tsyvinski, 2003. "Designing optimal disability insurance," Working Papers 628, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:osf:lawarx:jksyp. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: OSF (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://osf.io/preprints/lawarxiv/discover .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.