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Hidden Illiquidity with Multiple Central Counterparties

Author

Listed:
  • Paul Glasserman

    (Office of Financial Research
    Columbia University)

  • Ciamac C. Moallemi

    (Columbia University)

  • Kai Yuan

    (Columbia University)

Abstract

Regulatory changes are transforming the multi-trillion dollar swaps market from a network of bilateral contracts to one in which swaps are cleared through central counterparties (CCPs). The stability of the new framework depends on the resilience of CCPs. Margin requirements are a CCP’s first line of defense against the default of a counterparty. To capture liquidity costs at default, margin requirements need to increase superlinearly in position size. However, convex margin requirements create an incentive for a swaps dealer to split its positions across multiple CCPs, effectively "hiding" potential liquidation costs from each CCP. To compensate, each CCP needs to set higher margin requirements than it would in isolation. In a model with two CCPs, we define an equilibrium as a pair of margin schedules through which both CCPs collect sufficient margin under a dealer’s optimal allocation of trades. In the case of linear price impact, we show that a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of an equilibrium is that the two CCPs agree on liquidity costs, and we characterize all equilibria when this holds. A difference in views can lead to a race to the bottom. We provide extensions of this result and discuss its implications for CCP oversight and risk management.

Suggested Citation

  • Paul Glasserman & Ciamac C. Moallemi & Kai Yuan, 2015. "Hidden Illiquidity with Multiple Central Counterparties," Working Papers 15-07, Office of Financial Research, US Department of the Treasury.
    • Handle: RePEc:ofr:wpaper:15-07
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Bruno Biais & Florian Heider & Marie Hoerova, 2012. "Clearing, Counterparty Risk, and Aggregate Risk," IMF Economic Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Monetary Fund, vol. 60(2), pages 193-222, July.
    2. Kyle, Albert S, 1985. "Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(6), pages 1315-1335, November.
    3. Kathryn Chen & Michael J. Fleming & John Jackson & Ada Li & Asani Sarkar, 2011. "An analysis of CDS transactions: implications for public reporting," Staff Reports 517, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Andrea Aguiar & Dror Y. Kenett & Richard Bookstaber & Thomas Wipf, 2016. "A Map of Collateral Uses and Flows," Working Papers 16-06, Office of Financial Research, US Department of the Treasury.
    2. Office of Financial Research (ed.), . "New Public Disclosures Shed Light on Central Counterparties," Viewpoint Papers, Office of Financial Research, US Department of the Treasury, number 17-02, May.
    3. Corradin, Stefano & Heider, Florian & Hoerova, Marie, 2017. "On collateral: implications for financial stability and monetary policy," Working Paper Series 2107, European Central Bank.
    4. Gabrielle Demange & Thibaut Piquard, 2021. "On the market structure of central counterparties in the EU," Working Papers halshs-03107812, HAL.
    5. Demange, Gabrielle & Piquard, Thibaut, 2023. "On the choice of central counterparties in the EU," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 64(C).
    6. Inaki Aldasoro & Luitgard A M Veraart, 2022. "Systemic Risk in Markets with Multiple Central Counterparties," BIS Working Papers 1052, Bank for International Settlements.
    7. repec:ecb:ecbdps:20174 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Ghamami, Samim & Glasserman, Paul, 2017. "Does OTC derivatives reform incentivize central clearing?," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 76-87.
    9. Radoslav Raykov, 2019. "Systemic Risk and Collateral Adequacy," Staff Working Papers 19-23, Bank of Canada.
    10. Krahnen, Jan Pieter & Pelizzon, Loriana, 2016. ""Predatory" margins and the regulation and supervision of central counterparty clearing houses (CCPs)," SAFE White Paper Series 41, Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE.
    11. Wenqian Huang & Albert J. Menkveld & Shihao Yu, 2021. "Central Counterparty Exposure in Stressed Markets," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(6), pages 3596-3617, June.
    12. Samim Ghamami & Paul Glasserman, 2016. "Does OTC Derivatives Reform Incentivize Central Clearing?," Working Papers 16-07, Office of Financial Research, US Department of the Treasury.

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