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On the market structure of central counterparties in the EU

Author

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  • Gabrielle Demange

    (PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement)

  • Thibaut Piquard

    (PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, Banque de France - Banque de France - Banque de France)

Abstract

New regulations promote the role of Central Counter-Parties as insurers of counterparty risk to stabilize derivative markets. Most CCPs are for-profit institutions, competing for profits and market shares. Whether competition is harmful or beneficial to efficiency and financial stability is debatable, leading to different positions in the US and the EU. Assessing the impact of competition between CCPs is complex because of the many dimensions involved in their policies and the heterogeneity of their potential users, ranging from main intermediaries (the dealers) to final clients. We first review the business model of CCPs and illustrate the dimensions on which CCPs compete by gathering EU data on CCPs, their scopes, their clients and members. We then focus on the clearing of CDS by providing an empirical analysis of on the choices of CCPs by the main dealers.

Suggested Citation

  • Gabrielle Demange & Thibaut Piquard, 2021. "On the market structure of central counterparties in the EU," Working Papers halshs-03107812, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-03107812
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-03107812v1
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Luitgard Anna Maria Veraart & Iñaki Aldasoro, 2025. "Systemic risk in markets with multiple central counterparties," Mathematical Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(1), pages 214-262, January.

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