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On Renegotiation-Proof Contracts in Repeated Agency

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  • Rui Zhao

Abstract

In this paper I study ``renegotiation-proof" contracts in infinite-horizon principal-agent environment. A concept of renegotiation-proofness is adopted, which not only has the appeal of intuitively generalizing its counterpart in finite-horizon environment but proves to be a powerful device for characterizing the allocations that satisfy the notion. It is shown that renegotiation-proof contracts exist under broad conditions and admit simple characterizations.

Suggested Citation

  • Rui Zhao, 2001. "On Renegotiation-Proof Contracts in Repeated Agency," Discussion Papers 01-06, University at Albany, SUNY, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:nya:albaec:01-06
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    File URL: http://www.albany.edu/economics/research/workingp/2001/renegotiation_zhao.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. In-Uck Park, 2004. "Moral Hazard Contracting and Private Credit Markets," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 72(3), pages 701-746, May.
    2. Stephen E. Spear & Sanjay Srivastava, 1987. "On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 54(4), pages 599-617.
    3. Oliver D. Hart & Jean Tirole, 1988. "Contract Renegotiation and Coasian Dynamics," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 55(4), pages 509-540.
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    Cited by:

    1. Wang, Cheng, 2011. "Termination of dynamic contracts in an equilibrium labor market model," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(1), pages 74-110, January.

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