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Social Cognition in the Evolutionary Chicken Game

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Abstract

This paper explores a model of bounded rationality in evolutionary game play in which agent choice is based on a social psychological process of categorization and social inference. The computer simulation of the model demonstrates that agents' increasing ability to categorize opponents in the chicken game affords a higher population average payoff and introduces increasing social stratification among them. Greater trait diversity and population size are shown to have a harmful effect on payoffs. A VERSION OF THIS PAPER IS FORTHCOMING IN COMPUTATIONAL ECONOMICS UNDER THE TITLE "THE COGNITIVE ORGINS OF SOCIAL STRATIFICATION".

Suggested Citation

  • Robert Hoffmann, 2001. "Social Cognition in the Evolutionary Chicken Game," Occasional Papers 2, Industrial Economics Division, revised 10 Apr 2001.
    • Handle: RePEc:nub:occpap:2
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    File URL: http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/%7Elizecon/RePEc/pdf/chicken.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    bounded rationality; social cognition; chicken game; stereotypes; categorization; adaptive expectations; social inference; discrimination; social stratification;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • J71 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor Discrimination - - - Hiring and Firing
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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