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Industry Self-Regulation: A Game-Theoretic Typology of Strategic Voluntary Compliance

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Abstract

We analyse the possibility of successful industry self-regulation in terms of the strategic interactions between industry members and government. In particular, this paper presents a game-theoretic typology of generic self-regulatory scenarios and evaluates these in terms of the resulting likelihood of collective compliance. Examples for the scenarios are discussed and conclusions for corporate and public policy offered.

Suggested Citation

  • Simon Ashby & Swee Hoon Chuah & Robert Hoffmann, 2003. "Industry Self-Regulation: A Game-Theoretic Typology of Strategic Voluntary Compliance," Occasional Papers 2, Nottingham University Business School.
    • Handle: RePEc:nom:occasi:2
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Hart, Oliver, 1995. "Corporate Governance: Some Theory and Implications," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 105(430), pages 678-689, May.
    2. Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January.
    3. Avner Shared & John Sutton, 1981. "The Self-Regulating Profession," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 48(2), pages 217-234.
    4. Kandori, Michihiro & Mailath, George J & Rob, Rafael, 1993. "Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 29-56, January.
    5. Shiell, Alan & Chapman, Simon, 2000. "The inertia of self-regulation: a game-theoretic approach to reducing passive smoking in restaurants," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 51(7), pages 1111-1119, October.
    6. Bomsel, O. & Borkey, P. & Glachant, M. & Leveque, F., 1996. "Is there room for environmental self-regulation in the mining sector?," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 22(1-2), pages 79-86.
    7. Nunez, Javier, 2001. "A model of self-regulation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 91-97, December.
    8. Telser, L G, 1980. "A Theory of Self-enforcing Agreements," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 53(1), pages 27-44, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Nick Lin-Hi & Igor Blumberg, 2017. "The Power(lessness) of Industry Self-regulation to Promote Responsible Labor Standards: Insights from the Chinese Toy Industry," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 143(4), pages 789-805, July.
    2. Gonzalez, Patrick, 2011. "Certification as a Rationale for Voluntary Agreements," Working Papers 117827, University of Laval, Center for Research on the Economics of the Environment, Agri-food, Transports and Energy (CREATE).
    3. Cave, Jonathan & Marsden, Christopher, 2008. "Quis custodiet ipsos custodies in the Internet: self-regulation as a threat and a promise," MPRA Paper 83193, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Gsottbauer, Elisabeth & van den Bergh, Jeroen C.J.M., 2014. "Environmental policy when pollutive consumption is sensitive to advertising: Norms versus status," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 39-50.
    5. Henry Adobor, 2012. "Ethical Issues in Outsourcing: The Case of Contract Medical Research and the Global Pharmaceutical Industry," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 105(2), pages 239-255, January.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    industry self-regulation; voluntary compliance; game theory; public goods; collective action.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • K20 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - General
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation

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