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Antitrust Merger Policy: Lessons from the Australian Experience

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  • Philip L. Williams
  • Graeme Woodbridge

Abstract

A study of the operation of Australia's merger policy over the last twenty-seven years can yield lessons for countries that are contemplating the introduction of their own merger policy. If it is to be used to enhance value, merger policy should provide that any possible increase in monopoly power be weighed against any increases in efficiency. The process by which this is achieved should be undertaken with speed and secrecy so as not to deter efficiency-enhancing mergers. The twin requirements of speed and secrecy will, in turn, present problems in achieving fair process and the creation of precedent.

Suggested Citation

  • Philip L. Williams & Graeme Woodbridge, 2003. "Antitrust Merger Policy: Lessons from the Australian Experience," NBER Working Papers 9600, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:9600
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    1. repec:bla:econom:v:43:y:1976:i:171:p:267-74 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Schwert, G. William, 1996. "Markup pricing in mergers and acquisitions," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 153-192, June.
    3. Green, Edward J & Porter, Robert H, 1984. "Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(1), pages 87-100, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. M. Idrees Khawaja & Musleh-Ud Din, 2007. "Determinants of Interest Spread in Pakistan," The Pakistan Development Review, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, vol. 46(2), pages 129-143.

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    JEL classification:

    • L4 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies

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