The Simple Economics of Open Source
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References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
- L31 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Nonprofit Institutions; NGOs; Social Entrepreneurship
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-IND-2000-03-20 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-INO-2000-03-20 (Innovation)
- NEP-MIC-2000-03-20 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-TID-2000-03-21 (Technology and Industrial Dynamics)
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