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Auction Design and the Market for Sulfur Dioxide Emissions

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Listed:
  • Paul L. Joskow
  • Richard Schmalensee
  • Elizabeth M. Bailey

Abstract

Title IV of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 created a market for electric utility emissions of sulfur dioxide (SO2). Recent papers have argued that flaws in the design of the auctions that are part of this market have adversely affected its performance. These papers incorrectly assume that trade can only occur at auctions, however. Our empirical analysis of the SO2 emissions market shows that the auctions have become a small part of a relatively efficient market and that the auction design problems that have attracted the most attention have had no effect on actual market prices

Suggested Citation

  • Paul L. Joskow & Richard Schmalensee & Elizabeth M. Bailey, 1996. "Auction Design and the Market for Sulfur Dioxide Emissions," NBER Working Papers 5745, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:5745
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Cason, Timothy N, 1995. "An Experimental Investigation of the Seller Incentives in the EPA's Emission Trading Auction," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(4), pages 905-922, September.
    2. Cason, Timothy N. & Plott, Charles R., 1996. "EPA's New Emissions Trading Mechanism: A Laboratory Evaluation," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 133-160, March.
    3. Karl Hausker, 1992. "The politics and economics of auction design in the market for sulfur dioxide pollution," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 11(4), pages 553-572.
    4. Cason Timothy N., 1993. "Seller Incentive Properties of EPA's Emission Trading Auction," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 177-195, September.
    5. Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1997. "Game theory and empirical economics: The case of auction data 1," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 1-35, January.
    6. Joskow, Paul L & Schmalensee, Richard, 1998. "The Political Economy of Market-Based Environmental Policy: The U.S. Acid Rain Program," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 41(1), pages 37-83, April.
    7. Fullerton, Don & McDermott, Shaun P. & Caulkins, Jonathan P., 1997. "Sulfur Dioxide Compliance of a Regulated Utility," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 32-53, September.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Cramton, Peter & Kerr, Suzi, 2002. "Tradeable carbon permit auctions: How and why to auction not grandfather," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 30(4), pages 333-345, March.
    2. Dijkstra, Bouwe R. & Haan, Marco, 2001. "Sellers' Hedging Incentives at EPA's Emission Trading Auction," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 41(3), pages 286-294, May.
    3. Brookshire, David S & Burness, H Stuart, 2001. "The Informational Role of the EPA SO2 Permit Auction," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 20(1), pages 43-60, July.
    4. Stavins, Robert & Keohane, Nathaniel & Revesz, Richard, 1997. "The Positive Political Economy of Instrument Choice in Environmental Policy," RFF Working Paper Series dp-97-25, Resources for the Future.
    5. Robert N. Stavins, 1998. "What Can We Learn from the Grand Policy Experiment? Lessons from SO2 Allowance Trading," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 12(3), pages 69-88, Summer.
    6. Sunnevåg, Kjell J., 2001. "Auction design for the allocation of multiple units of a homogenous good: Theoretical background and practical experience," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series qt6wh704p7, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
    7. Peter Cramton & Robert Wilson, 1998. "A Review of ISO New England's Proposed Market Rules," Papers of Peter Cramton 98mdi, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • Q25 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Water

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