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Salary History and Employer Demand: Evidence from a Two-Sided Audit

Author

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  • Amanda Y. Agan
  • Bo Cowgill
  • Laura K. Gee

Abstract

We study how salary disclosures affect employer demand using a field experiment featuring hundreds of recruiters and over 2,000 job applications. We randomize the presence of salary questions and the candidates’ disclosures. Employers make negative inferences about non-disclosing candidates, and view salary history as a stronger signal about competing options than worker quality. Disclosures by men (and other highly-paid candidates) yield higher salary offers, but are negative signals of value (net of salary), yielding fewer callbacks. Male wage premiums are regarded as a weaker signal of quality than other wage premiums (such as working at higher paying firms).

Suggested Citation

  • Amanda Y. Agan & Bo Cowgill & Laura K. Gee, 2021. "Salary History and Employer Demand: Evidence from a Two-Sided Audit," NBER Working Papers 29460, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:29460
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    Cited by:

    1. James Bessen & Erich Denk & Chen Meng, 2024. "Perpetuating wage inequality: evidence from salary history bans," The Journal of Economic Inequality, Springer;Society for the Study of Economic Inequality, vol. 22(3), pages 709-733, September.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General
    • J70 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor Discrimination - - - General
    • M50 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - General

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