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Deterrence and the Adjustment of Sentences During Imprisonment

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  • A. Mitchell Polinsky
  • Steven Shavell

Abstract

The prison time actually served by a convicted criminal depends to a significant degree on decisions made by the state during the course of imprisonment—notably, on whether to grant parole. We study a model of the adjustment of sentences assuming that the state’s objective is the optimal deterrence of crime. In the model, the state can lower or raise a criminal’s initial sentence on the basis of deterrence-relevant information obtained during imprisonment. Our focus on sentence adjustment as a means of promoting deterrence stands in contrast to the usual emphasis in sentence adjustment policy on avoiding recidivism.

Suggested Citation

  • A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 2019. "Deterrence and the Adjustment of Sentences During Imprisonment," NBER Working Papers 26083, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:26083
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Pyne, Derek, 2015. "Can early release both reduce prison costs and increase deterrence?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 135(C), pages 69-71.
    2. Steven Shavell, 1979. "Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 55-73, Spring.
    3. Steven Shavell & A. Mitchell Polinsky, 2000. "The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 38(1), pages 45-76, March.
    4. Aaron Chalfin & Justin McCrary, 2017. "Criminal Deterrence: A Review of the Literature," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 55(1), pages 5-48, March.
    5. Ilyana Kuziemko, 2013. "How should inmates be released from prison? An assessment of parole versus fixed-sentence regimes," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 128(1), pages 371-424.
    6. Dan Bernhardt & Steeve Mongrain & Joanne Roberts, 2012. "Rehabilitated or Not: An Informational Theory of Parole Decisions," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 28(2), pages 186-210.
    7. Mitchell Polinsky, A., 2015. "Deterrence and the optimality of rewarding prisoners for good behavior," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 1-7.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • K14 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Criminal Law
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

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