IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/nbr/nberwo/24921.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Frictions in a Competitive, Regulated Market: Evidence from Taxis

Author

Listed:
  • Guillaume R. Fréchette
  • Alessandro Lizzeri
  • Tobias Salz

Abstract

This paper presents a dynamic general equilibrium model of a taxi market. The model is estimated using data from New York City yellow cabs. Two salient features by which most taxi markets deviate from the efficient market ideal are, first, matching frictions created by the need for both market sides to physically search for trading partners, and second, regulatory limitations to entry. To assess the importance of these features, we use the model to simulate the effect of changes in entry, alternative matching technologies, and different market density. We use the geographical features of the matching process to back out unobserved demand through a matching simulation. This function exhibits increasing returns to scale, which is important to understand the impact of changes in this market and has welfare implications. For instance, although alternative dispatch platforms can be more efficient than street-hailing, platform competition is harmful because it reduces effective density.

Suggested Citation

  • Guillaume R. Fréchette & Alessandro Lizzeri & Tobias Salz, 2018. "Frictions in a Competitive, Regulated Market: Evidence from Taxis," NBER Working Papers 24921, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:24921
    Note: IO
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w24921.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Rust, John, 1987. "Optimal Replacement of GMC Bus Engines: An Empirical Model of Harold Zurcher," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(5), pages 999-1033, September.
    2. Jean‐Pierre Dubé & Jeremy T. Fox & Che‐Lin Su, 2012. "Improving the Numerical Performance of Static and Dynamic Aggregate Discrete Choice Random Coefficients Demand Estimation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 80(5), pages 2231-2267, September.
    3. Colin Camerer & Linda Babcock & George Loewenstein & Richard Thaler, 1997. "Labor Supply of New York City Cabdrivers: One Day at a Time," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 112(2), pages 407-441.
    4. Patrick Bajari & C. Lanier Benkard & Jonathan Levin, 2007. "Estimating Dynamic Models of Imperfect Competition," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 75(5), pages 1331-1370, September.
    5. Ricardo Lagos, 2003. "An Analysis of the Market for Taxicab Rides in New York City," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 44(2), pages 423-434, May.
    6. Vincent P. Crawford & Juanjuan Meng, 2011. "New York City Cab Drivers' Labor Supply Revisited: Reference-Dependent Preferences with Rational-Expectations Targets for Hours and Income," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(5), pages 1912-1932, August.
    7. Che‐Lin Su & Kenneth L. Judd, 2012. "Constrained Optimization Approaches to Estimation of Structural Models," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 80(5), pages 2213-2230, September.
    8. Berry, Steven T, 1992. "Estimation of a Model of Entry in the Airline Industry," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(4), pages 889-917, July.
    9. Judd Cramer & Alan B. Krueger, 2016. "Disruptive Change in the Taxi Business: The Case of Uber," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(5), pages 177-182, May.
    10. Stephen P. Ryan, 2012. "The Costs of Environmental Regulation in a Concentrated Industry," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 80(3), pages 1019-1061, May.
    11. Myrto Kalouptsidi, 2014. "Time to Build and Fluctuations in Bulk Shipping," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(2), pages 564-608, February.
    12. C. Kirabo Jackson & Henry S. Schneider, 2011. "Do Social Connections Reduce Moral Hazard? Evidence from the New York City Taxi Industry," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 3(3), pages 244-267, July.
    13. Gerald S. Oettinger, 1999. "An Empirical Analysis of the Daily Labor Supply of Stadium Vendors," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(2), pages 360-392, April.
    14. Cantillon, Estelle & Yin, Pai-Ling, 2008. "Competition between Exchanges: Lessons from the Battle of the Bund," CEPR Discussion Papers 6923, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    15. Frank A. Wolak, 1994. "An Econometric Analysis of the Asymmetric Information, Regulator-Utility Interaction," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 34, pages 1-12.
    16. repec:adr:anecst:y:1994:i:34:p:02 is not listed on IDEAS
    17. Henry S. Farber, 2008. "Reference-Dependent Preferences and Labor Supply: The Case of New York City Taxi Drivers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(3), pages 1069-1082, June.
    18. Bresnahan, Timothy F & Reiss, Peter C, 1991. "Entry and Competition in Concentrated Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 99(5), pages 977-1009, October.
    19. Panle Jia, 2008. "What Happens When Wal-Mart Comes to Town: An Empirical Analysis of the Discount Retailing Industry," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 76(6), pages 1263-1316, November.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Victor Aguirregabiria & Margaret Slade, 2017. "Empirical models of firms and industries," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 50(5), pages 1445-1488, December.
    2. Aguirregabiria, Victor & Nevo, Aviv, 2010. "Recent developments in empirical IO: dynamic demand and dynamic games," MPRA Paper 27814, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Jeremy T. Fox, 2018. "Estimating matching games with transfers," Quantitative Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 9(1), pages 1-38, March.
    4. Sumon Datta & K. Sudhir, 2023. "The Agglomeration-Differentiation Tradeoff in Spatial Location Choice," Customer Needs and Solutions, Springer;Institute for Sustainable Innovation and Growth (iSIG), vol. 10(1), pages 1-25, December.
    5. Victor Aguirregabiria & Gustavo Vicentini, 2006. "Dynamic Spatial Competition Between Multi-Store Firms," Working Papers tecipa-253, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
    6. Brodeur, Abel & Nield, Kerry, 2018. "An empirical analysis of taxi, Lyft and Uber rides: Evidence from weather shocks in NYC," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 152(C), pages 1-16.
    7. Giulia Brancaccio & Myrto Kalouptsidi & Theodore Papageorgiou, 2020. "Geography, Transportation, and Endogenous Trade Costs," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 88(2), pages 657-691, March.
    8. Xiaoyu Xia & Juin Kuan Chong, 2022. "No Magic for Market Entry in the Field: Evidence from Taxi Markets," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(6), pages 4670-4684, June.
    9. Yanfei Wang, 2022. "Competition And Multilevel Technology Adoption: A Dynamic Analysis Of Electronic Medical Records Adoption In U.S. Hospitals," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 63(3), pages 1357-1395, August.
    10. Paul Ellickson & Sanjog Misra, 2012. "Enriching interactions: Incorporating outcome data into static discrete games," Quantitative Marketing and Economics (QME), Springer, vol. 10(1), pages 1-26, March.
    11. Sanjog Misra, 2013. "Markov chain Monte Carlo for incomplete information discrete games," Quantitative Marketing and Economics (QME), Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 117-153, March.
    12. Mitsukuni Nishida, 2015. "Estimating a Model of Strategic Network Choice: The Convenience-Store Industry in Okinawa," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 34(1), pages 20-38, January.
    13. Martin, Vincent, 2017. "When to quit: Narrow bracketing and reference dependence in taxi drivers," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 144(C), pages 166-187.
    14. Christian Bontemps & Raquel Menezes Bezerra Sampaio, 2020. "Entry games for the airline industry," Post-Print hal-02137358, HAL.
    15. Hai Long Duong & Junhong Chu & Dai Yao, 2023. "Taxi Drivers’ Response to Cancellations and No-Shows: New Evidence for Reference-Dependent Preferences," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(1), pages 179-199, January.
    16. Yingjie Zhang & Beibei Li & Ramayya Krishnan, 2020. "Learning Individual Behavior Using Sensor Data: The Case of Global Positioning System Traces and Taxi Drivers," Information Systems Research, INFORMS, vol. 31(4), pages 1301-1321, December.
    17. Chang, Tom & Gross, Tal, 2014. "How many pears would a pear packer pack if a pear packer could pack pears at quasi-exogenously varying piece rates?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 1-17.
    18. Giné, Xavier & Martinez-Bravo, Monica & Vidal-Fernández, Marian, 2017. "Are labor supply decisions consistent with neoclassical preferences? Evidence from Indian boat owners," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 331-347.
    19. Loukas Balafoutas & Rudolf Kerschbamer & Matthias Sutter, 2017. "Second‐Degree Moral Hazard In A Real‐World Credence Goods Market," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 127(599), pages 1-18, February.
    20. Chen, Chia-Wen, 2014. "Estimating the foreclosure effect of exclusive dealing: Evidence from the entry of specialty beer producers," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 47-64.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • J22 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Time Allocation and Labor Supply
    • L0 - Industrial Organization - - General
    • L5 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy
    • L91 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Transportation: General

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:24921. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/nberrus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.