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Institutions and Political Party Systems: The Euro Case

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  • Jesús Fernández-Villaverde
  • Tano Santos

Abstract

This paper argues that institutions and political party systems are simultaneously determined. A large change to the institutional framework, such as the creation of the euro by a group of European countries, will realign – after a transition period – the party system as well. The new political landscape may not be compatible with the institutions that triggered it. To illustrate this point, we study the case of the euro and how the party system has evolved in Southern and Northern European countries in response to it.

Suggested Citation

  • Jesús Fernández-Villaverde & Tano Santos, 2017. "Institutions and Political Party Systems: The Euro Case," NBER Working Papers 23599, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:23599
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jesús Fernández-Villaverde & Luis Garicano & Tano Santos, 2013. "Political Credit Cycles: The Case of the Eurozone," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 27(3), pages 145-166, Summer.
    2. Markus K. Brunnermeier & Harold James & Jean-Pierre Landau, 2016. "The Euro and the Battle of Ideas," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, number 10828.
    3. Funke, Manuel & Schularick, Moritz & Trebesch, Christoph, 2016. "Going to extremes: Politics after financial crises, 1870–2014," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 227-260.
    4. Martin Feldstein, 1997. "The Political Economy of the European Economic and Monetary Union: Political Sources of an Economic Liability," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 11(4), pages 23-42, Fall.
    5. Georgy Egorov & Konstantin Sonin, 2013. "A Political Theory of Populism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 128(2), pages 771-805.
    6. James, Harold, 2012. "Making the European Monetary Union," Economics Books, Harvard University Press, number 9780674066830, Spring.
    7. Felix Roth & Lars Jonung & Felicitas Nowak-Lehmann D., 2022. "Crisis and Public Support for the Euro, 1990–2014," Contributions to Economics, in: Public Support for the Euro, chapter 0, pages 55-91, Springer.
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    Cited by:

    1. Dani Rodrik, 2018. "Populism and the economics of globalization," Journal of International Business Policy, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 1(1), pages 12-33, June.
    2. Jésus Fernández-Villaverde & Carlos Sanz & Jesús Fernández-Villaverde, 2024. "Classical Right, New Right, and Voting Behavior: Evidence from a Quasi-Natural Experiment," CESifo Working Paper Series 11179, CESifo.
    3. Jesus Fernandez-Villaverde & Lee Ohanian, 2018. "The Lack of European Productivity Growth: Causes and Lessons for the U.S," PIER Working Paper Archive 18-024, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 07 Sep 2018.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • F30 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - General
    • F40 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - General

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