The Mortality Cost of Political Connections
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- Raymond Fisman & Yongxiang Wang, 2015. "The Mortality Cost of Political Connections," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 82(4), pages 1346-1382.
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- J81 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor Standards - - - Working Conditions
- P26 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies - - - Property Rights
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-HEA-2015-06-20 (Health Economics)
- NEP-LAB-2015-06-20 (Labour Economics)
- NEP-POL-2015-06-20 (Positive Political Economics)
- NEP-TRA-2015-06-20 (Transition Economics)
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