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When do firms hire lobbyists? The organization of lobbying at the Federal Communications Commission

Author

Listed:
  • John M. de Figueiredo
  • James J. Kim

Abstract

This paper examines the explanatory power of transaction cost economics to explain vertical integration decisions for lobbying by firms. We examine lobbying contacts at the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) on the issue of payphone compensation for dial-around calls. When firms lobby on topics that are highly firm-specific and prone to sensitive-information leakage, they are more likely to use employees to lobby the FCC. However, when topics arise that are more general to the industry and do not include sensitive information, firms are more likely to use outside counsel to lobby the FCC. Copyright 2004, Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • John M. de Figueiredo & James J. Kim, 2004. "When do firms hire lobbyists? The organization of lobbying at the Federal Communications Commission," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press and the Associazione ICC, vol. 13(6), pages 883-900, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:indcch:v:13:y:2004:i:6:p:883-900
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Miguel Espinosa, 2021. "Labor Boundaries and Skills: The Case of Lobbyists," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(3), pages 1586-1607, March.
    2. Daniel J. Blake & Srividya Jandhyala, 2019. "Managing Policy Reversals: Consequences for Firm Performance," Strategy Science, INFORMS, vol. 4(2), pages 111-128, June.
    3. R. W. Major & Madina Rival, 2012. "From informal practices to formal conduct: Which ethical practices and issues for French lobbying consulting?," Working Papers halshs-00709380, HAL.
    4. repec:ces:ifodic:v:8:y:2010:i:4:p:14994986 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Madina Rival, 2012. "Entreprises privées et décision publique. Acteurs et organisation stratégique du lobbying dans les grandes entreprises en France," Post-Print hal-02901099, HAL.
    6. Klein, Peter G. & Mahoney, Joseph T. & McGahan, Anita M. & Pitelis, Christos N., 2011. "Resources, Capabilities, and Routines in Public Organization," Working Papers 11-0101, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, College of Business.
    7. John M. de Figueiredo & Edward H. Stiglitz, 2015. "Democratic Rulemaking," NBER Working Papers 21765, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Silke Friedrich, 2010. "Measuring Interest Group Activity," ifo DICE Report, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 8(04), pages 37-46, January.
    9. Silke Friedrich, 2010. "Measuring Interest Group Activity," ifo DICE Report, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 8(4), pages 37-46, 01.
    10. John M. de Figueiredo & Brian Kelleher Richter, 2013. "Advancing the Empirical Research on Lobbying," NBER Working Papers 19698, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. John M. de Figueiredo, 2009. "Integrated Political Strategy," NBER Working Papers 15053, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Fernández-Méndez, Laura & García-Canal, Esteban & Guillén, Mauro F., 2018. "Domestic political connections and international expansion: It's not only ‘who you know’ that matters," Journal of World Business, Elsevier, vol. 53(5), pages 695-711.

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