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Taxes, Debts, and Redistributions with Aggregate Shocks

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Listed:
  • Anmol Bhandari
  • David Evans
  • Mikhail Golosov
  • Thomas J. Sargent

Abstract

A planner sets a lump sum transfer and a linear tax on labor income in an economy with incomplete markets, heterogeneous agents, and aggregate shocks. The planner's concerns about redistribution impart a welfare cost to fluctuating transfers. The distribution of net asset holdings across agents affects optimal allocations, transfers, and tax rates, but the level of government debt does not. Two forces shape long-run outcomes: the planner's desire to minimize the welfare costs of fluctuating transfers, which calls for a negative correlation between the distribution of net assets and agents' skills; and the planner's desire to use fluctuations in the real interest rate to adjust for missing state-contingent securities. In a model parameterized to match stylized facts about US booms and recessions, distributional concerns mainly determine optimal policies over business cycle frequencies. These features of optimal policy differ markedly from ones that emerge from representative agent Ramsey models like Aiyagari et al (2002).

Suggested Citation

  • Anmol Bhandari & David Evans & Mikhail Golosov & Thomas J. Sargent, 2013. "Taxes, Debts, and Redistributions with Aggregate Shocks," NBER Working Papers 19470, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:19470
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Alisdair McKay & Ricardo Reis, 2021. "Optimal Automatic Stabilizers [Consumption versus Expenditure]," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 88(5), pages 2375-2406.
    2. Röhrs, Sigrid & Winter, Christoph, 2017. "Reducing government debt in the presence of inequality," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 1-20.
    3. Dirk Niepelt, 2018. "Financial Policy," Diskussionsschriften dp1802, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
    4. Yanlei Ma, 2014. "Income Inequality, Political Polarization and Fiscal Policy Gridlock," 2014 Meeting Papers 547, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    5. Axelle Ferriere & Anastasios G. Karantounias, 2019. "Fiscal Austerity in Ambiguous Times," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 11(1), pages 89-131, January.
    6. Thomas Sargent & Mikhail Golosov & David Evans & anmol bhandari, 2014. "Optimal Taxation with Incomplete Markets," 2014 Meeting Papers 1276, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    7. Froemel, Maren & Paczos, Wojtek, 2024. "Imperfect financial markets and the cyclicality of social spending," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 167(C).
    8. Wei Cui & Sören Radde, 2014. "Search-Based Endogenous Illiquidity and the Macroeconomy," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1367, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    9. Chatzouz, Moustafa, 2014. "Government Debt and Wealth Inequality: Theory and Insights from Altruism," MPRA Paper 77007, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    10. Davide Debortoli & Ricardo Nunes & Pierre Yared, 2017. "Optimal Time-Consistent Government Debt Maturity," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 132(1), pages 55-102.
    11. Romei, Federica, 2015. "Need for (the Right) Speed: the Timing and Composition of Public Debt Deleveraging," Economics Working Papers MWP2015/11, European University Institute.
    12. John Stachurski & Junnan Zhang, 2019. "Dynamic Programming with State-Dependent Discounting," Papers 1908.08800, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2020.
    13. François Legrand & Xavier Ragot, 2016. "Optimal policy with heterogeneous agents and aggregate shocks : An application to optimal public debt dynamics," 2016 Meeting Papers 1272, Society for Economic Dynamics.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • H63 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt

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