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Public debt in economies with heterogeneous agents

Author

Listed:
  • Bhandari, Anmol
  • Evans, David
  • Golosov, Mikhail
  • Sargent, Thomas J.

Abstract

We study public debt in competitive equilibria in which a government chooses transfers and taxes optimally and in addition decides how thoroughly to enforce debt contracts. If the government enforces perfectly, asset inequality is determined in an optimum competitive equilibrium but the level of government debt is not. Welfare increases if private debt contracts are not enforced. Borrowing frictions let the government gather monopoly rents that come from issuing public debt without facing competing private borrowers. Regardless of whether the government chooses to enforce private debt contracts, the level of initial government debt does not affect an optimal allocation.

Suggested Citation

  • Bhandari, Anmol & Evans, David & Golosov, Mikhail & Sargent, Thomas J., 2017. "Public debt in economies with heterogeneous agents," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 39-51.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:moneco:v:91:y:2017:i:c:p:39-51
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2017.09.007
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    4. Mark Aguiar & Manuel Amador & Cristina Arellano, 2021. "Micro Risks and Pareto Improving Policies with Low Interest Rates," Staff Report 625, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
    5. François Courtoy, 2022. "When Household Heterogeneity Matters Optimal Fiscal Policy in a Medium-Scale TANK Model," LIDAM Discussion Papers IRES 2022009, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
    6. D’Erasmo, Pablo & Mendoza, Enrique G., 2021. "History remembered: Optimal sovereign default on domestic and external debt," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 969-989.
    7. Bayer, Christian & Born, Benjamin & Luetticke, Ralph, 2023. "The liquidity channel of fiscal policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 86-117.
    8. Ruediger Bachmann & Jinhui Bai & Minjoon Lee & Fudong Zhang, 2020. "The Welfare and Distributional Effects of Fiscal Volatility: a Quantitative Evaluation," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 38, pages 127-153, October.
    9. Anmol Bhandari & David Evans & Mikhail Golosov & Thomas J. Sargent, 2021. "Inequality, Business Cycles, and Monetary‐Fiscal Policy," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 89(6), pages 2559-2599, November.
    10. Boris Chafwehé & François Courtoy, 2021. "Optimal Taxes and Transfers with Household Heterogeneity," LIDAM Discussion Papers IRES 2021009, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
    11. Chien, YiLi & Wen, Yi, 2021. "Time-inconsistent optimal quantity of debt," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 140(C).
    12. Mark Aguiar & Manuel Amador & Cristina Arellano, 2021. "Micro Risks and Pareto Improving Policies," Working Papers 2021-15, Princeton University. Economics Department..
    13. Chien, YiLi & Wen, Yi, 2022. "The determination of public debt under both aggregate and idiosyncratic uncertainty," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 203(C).
    14. Yi‐Chan Tsai & C. C. Yang & Hsin‐Jung Yu, 2022. "Rising skill premium and the dynamics of optimal capital and labor taxation," Quantitative Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 13(3), pages 1061-1099, July.
    15. Anmol Bhandari & David Evans & Mikhail Golosov & Thomas Sargent, 2019. "The Optimal Maturity of Government Debt," 2019 Meeting Papers 1011, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    16. Scholl, Almuth, 2024. "The politics of redistribution and sovereign default," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 148(C).
    17. Christian Myohl, 2018. "Optimal Fiscal Policy and Private Sector Borrowing Constraints," Diskussionsschriften dp1822, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
    18. Osband, Kent & Filoso, Valerio & Capasso, Salvatore, 2024. "The limits of limitless debt," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).

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