Quality Provision, Expected Firm Altruism and Brand Extensions
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Cited by:
- Jeanine Miklós-Thal, 2012. "Linking reputations through umbrella branding," Quantitative Marketing and Economics (QME), Springer, vol. 10(3), pages 335-374, September.
- Eric Rasmusen, 2011. "Leveraging of Reputation Through Umbrella Branding with and Without Market Power," Working Papers 2011-07, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers
- L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
- L21 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Business Objectives of the Firm
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