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Confronting Divergent Interests in Cross-Country Regulatory Arrangements

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  • Edward J. Kane

Abstract

Although nation-based systems of financial regulation constitute a second-best approach to global welfare maximization, treacherous accountability problems must be acknowledged and resolved before regulatory cooperation can deal fairly and efficiently with cross-border issues. To track and control insolvency risk within and across any set of countries, officials must construct a partnership that allows regulators in every participating country to monitor and to influence counterpart regulators in partnering nations. Using efforts to harmonize the Australian and New Zealand regulatory systems as an example, this paper identifies characteristics by which regulatory systems differ and underscores particular features that make regulatory harmonization difficult to achieve.

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  • Edward J. Kane, 2005. "Confronting Divergent Interests in Cross-Country Regulatory Arrangements," NBER Working Papers 11865, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:11865
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    2. Gerard Caprio & Patrick Honohan, 2008. "Banking Crises," Center for Development Economics 2008-09, Department of Economics, Williams College.
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    Cited by:

    1. Robert A. Eisenbeis, 2007. "Home Country Versus Cross-Border Negative Externalities in Large Banking Organization Failures and How to Avoid them," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Douglas D Evanoff & George G Kaufman & John R LaBrosse (ed.), International Financial Instability Global Banking and National Regulation, chapter 13, pages 181-200, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    2. Marcelo Rezende, 2011. "How Do Joint Supervisors Examine Financial Institutions? The Case of Banks," Chapters, in: Sylvester Eijffinger & Donato Masciandaro (ed.), Handbook of Central Banking, Financial Regulation and Supervision, chapter 18, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    3. Tim Ng, 2007. "The Reserve Bank’s policy on outsourcing by banks," Reserve Bank of New Zealand Bulletin, Reserve Bank of New Zealand, vol. 70, June.
    4. Edward J. Kane, 2016. "A Theory of How and Why Central-Bank Culture Supports Predatory Risk-Taking at Megabanks," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 44(1), pages 51-71, March.
    5. International Monetary Fund, 2006. "Euro Area Policies: Selected Issues," IMF Staff Country Reports 2006/288, International Monetary Fund.
    6. Marcelo Rezende, 2011. "How do joint supervisors examine financial institutions? the case of state banks," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2011-43, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    7. Edward J. Kane, 2014. "Insurance Contracts and Derivatives that Substitute for Them: How and Where Should Their Systemic and Nonperformance Risks be Regulated?," NFI Policy Briefs 2014-PB-03, Indiana State University, Scott College of Business, Networks Financial Institute.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • P51 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Comparative Economic Systems - - - Comparative Analysis of Economic Systems

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