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The 2007 Meltdown in Structured Securitization: Searching for Lessons not Scapegoats

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Abstract

The intensity of recent turbulence in financial markets has surprised nearly everyone. This paper searches out the root causes of the crisis, distinguishing them from scapegoating explanations that have been used in policy circles to divert attention from the underlying breakdown of incentives. Incentive conflicts explain how securitization went wrong, why credit ratings proved so inaccurate, and why it is superficial to blame the crisis on mark-to-market accounting, an unexpected loss of liquidity or trends in globalization and deregulation in financial markets. Our analysis finds disturbing implications of the crisis for Basel II and its implementation. We argue that the principal source of financial instability lies in contradictory political and bureaucratic incentives that undermine the effectiveness of financial regulation and supervision in every country in the world. We conclude the paper by identifying reforms that would improve incentives by increasing transparency and accountability in government and industry alike.

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  • Gerard Caprio & Asli Demirgüç-Kunt & Edward Kane, 2008. "The 2007 Meltdown in Structured Securitization: Searching for Lessons not Scapegoats," Department of Economics Working Papers 2008-08, Department of Economics, Williams College.
  • Handle: RePEc:wil:wileco:2008-08
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    Cited by:

    1. Alexander, Gordon J. & Baptista, Alexandre M. & Yan, Shu, 2013. "A comparison of the original and revised Basel market risk frameworks for regulating bank capital," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 249-268.
    2. Benbouzid, Nadia & Leonida, Leone & Mallick, Sushanta K., 2018. "The non-monotonic impact of bank size on their default swap spreads: Cross-country evidence," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 226-240.
    3. Alexander, Gordon J. & Baptista, Alexandre M. & Yan, Shu, 2012. "When more is less: Using multiple constraints to reduce tail risk," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 36(10), pages 2693-2716.
    4. Demirgüç-Kunt, Asli & Huizinga, Harry, 2010. "Bank activity and funding strategies: The impact on risk and returns," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 98(3), pages 626-650, December.
    5. Cihak, Martin & Demirguc-Kunt, Asli & Peria, Maria Soledad Martinez & Mohseni-Cheraghlou, Amin, 2012. "Bank regulation and supervision around the world : a crisis update," Policy Research Working Paper Series 6286, The World Bank.
    6. Alexander, Gordon J. & Baptista, Alexandre M. & Yan, Shu, 2014. "Bank regulation and international financial stability: A case against the 2006 Basel framework for controlling tail risk in trading books," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 107-130.
    7. Gerard Caprio, Jr. Williams College, 2009. "Financial Regulation in a Changing World: Lessons from the Recent Crisis," The Institute for International Integration Studies Discussion Paper Series iiisdp308, IIIS.
    8. David G. Tarr, 2010. "The political, regulatory, and market failures that caused the US financial crisis," Journal of Financial Economic Policy, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 2(2), pages 163-186, June.
    9. Calomiris, Charles W. & Love, Inessa & Martínez Pería, María Soledad, 2012. "Stock returns’ sensitivities to crisis shocks: Evidence from developed and emerging markets," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 743-765.
    10. Asli Demirgüç-Kunt & Luis Servén, 2010. "Are All the Sacred Cows Dead? Implications of the Financial Crisis for Macro- and Financial Policies," The World Bank Research Observer, World Bank, vol. 25(1), pages 91-124, February.
    11. Ke, Konglin & Xu, Wanting & He, Yujie, 2024. "Do regulatory penalties reduce risk-taking of banks?," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 70(C).
    12. López, Ramón, 2010. "Global economic crises, environmental-resource scarcity and wealth concentration," Revista CEPAL, Naciones Unidas Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL), December.
    13. Anastasia I. Koutsomanoli‐Filippaki & Emmanuel C. Mamatzakis, 2011. "Efficiency under quantile regression: What is the relationship with risk in the EU banking industry?," Review of Financial Economics, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 20(2), pages 84-95, May.
    14. Westman, Hanna, 2011. "The impact of management and board ownership on profitability in banks with different strategies," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 35(12), pages 3300-3318.
    15. Gerard Caprio, 2011. "Safe and Sound Banking: A Role for Countercyclical Regulatory Requirements?," Chapters, in: Sylvester Eijffinger & Donato Masciandaro (ed.), Handbook of Central Banking, Financial Regulation and Supervision, chapter 14, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    16. Machinea, José Luis, 2008. "The international financial crisis: its nature and the economic policy challenges," Revista CEPAL, Naciones Unidas Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL), August.
    17. Ngwu, Franklin N. & Bavoso, Vincenzo & Chen, Zheyang, 2017. "Securitisation in BRICS: Issues, challenges and prospects," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 1219-1227.
    18. Cihak, Martin & Demirgüç-Kunt, Asli & Martinez Peria, Maria Soledad & Mohseni-Cheraghlou, Amin, 2013. "Bank regulation and supervision in the context of the global crisis," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 9(4), pages 733-746.
    19. Lopez, Ramon E., 2009. "World Economic Crises in Times of Environmental Scarcity and Wealth Concentration," Working Papers 56408, University of Maryland, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics.
    20. Alexander, Gordon J. & Baptista, Alexandre M. & Yan, Shu, 2021. "Regulation of bank proprietary trading post 2007–09 crisis: An examination of the Basel framework and Volcker rule," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 119(C).
    21. William R. Cline, 2010. "Financial Globalization, Economic Growth, and the Crisis of 2007-09," Peterson Institute Press: All Books, Peterson Institute for International Economics, number 499, January.
    22. Gordon J. Alexander & Alexandre M. Baptista, 2017. "Bank Capital Regulation of Trading Portfolios: An Assessment of the Basel Framework," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 49(4), pages 603-634, June.
    23. Hilscher, Jens & Landskroner, Yoram & Raviv, Alon, 2021. "Optimal regulation, executive compensation and risk taking by financial institutions," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 71(C).
    24. Charles W. Calomiris & Inessa Love & Maria Soledad Martinez Peria, 2010. "Crisis "Shock Factors" and the Cross-Section of Global Equity Returns," NBER Working Papers 16559, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Financial crisis; Securitization; Regulation and Supervision; Safety Nets;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill

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