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Home Country Versus Cross-Border Negative Externalities in Large Banking Organization Failures and How to Avoid them

In: International Financial Instability Global Banking and National Regulation

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  • Robert A. Eisenbeis

    (Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, USA)

Abstract

The following sections are included:IntroductionSources and Nature of Systemic RisksNegative Externalities and Banking FailuresConflicts of Interest, Agency Costs, and Bankruptcy Laws: Their Role in Affecting the Negative Externalities of Banking FailuresSummary and ConclusionsReferences

Suggested Citation

  • Robert A. Eisenbeis, 2007. "Home Country Versus Cross-Border Negative Externalities in Large Banking Organization Failures and How to Avoid them," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Douglas D Evanoff & George G Kaufman & John R LaBrosse (ed.), International Financial Instability Global Banking and National Regulation, chapter 13, pages 181-200, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    • Handle: RePEc:wsi:wschap:9789812708731_0013
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    Cited by:

    1. Zuzana Brixiova & Laura Vartia & Andreas Woergoetter, 2009. "Capital Inflows, Household Debt And The Boom Bust Cycle In Estonia," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series wp965, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
    2. Edward Kane, 2007. "Connecting National Safety Nets: The Dialectics of the Basel II Contracting Process," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 35(4), pages 399-409, December.
    3. Santiago Carbo-Valverde & Edward Kane & Francisco Rodriguez-Fernandez, 2008. "Evidence of Differences in the Effectiveness of Safety-Net Management in European Union Countries," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 34(2), pages 151-176, December.
    4. Christine M. Cumming & Robert A. Eisenbeis, 2010. "Resolving troubled systemically important cross-border financial institutions: is a new corporate organizational form required?," Staff Reports 457, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    5. International Monetary Fund, 2008. "Cross-Border Coordination of Prudential Supervision and Deposit Guarantees," IMF Working Papers 2008/283, International Monetary Fund.

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