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A Prelude to the Welfare State: Compulsory State Insurance and Workers' Compensation in Minnesota, Ohio, and Washington, 1911-1919

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Abstract

Dissatisfaction with the high transaction costs of compensating workers for their injuries led seven states in the 1910s to enact legislation requiring that employers insure their workers' compensation risks through exclusive state insurance funds. This paper traces the political-economic history of the success of compulsory state insurance in three states in the 1910s -- Minnesota, Ohio, and Washington. State insurance gained broad support in these states because a coalition of progressive legislators took control of their respective legislatures, bringing with them the idea that government had the unique ability to correct market imperfections. The political environment in which state insurance thrived in the 1910s provides important insights into the growth of government in the 1930s and 1960s. The major social insurance programs of the New Deal and the Great Society were widely supported at the time because the private market was seen as unable to solve a particular problem, such as unemployment compensation or poverty in old-age. This paper argues that the government's dramatic expansion after the 1932 federal election was not unprecedented; in fact, the ideological roots of New Deal activism were planted during the debates over compulsory state insurance and workers' compensation in the 1910s.

Suggested Citation

  • Shawn E. Kantor, 1994. "A Prelude to the Welfare State: Compulsory State Insurance and Workers' Compensation in Minnesota, Ohio, and Washington, 1911-1919," NBER Historical Working Papers 0064, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberhi:0064
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    1. Claudia Goldin & Gary D. Libecap, 1994. "Introduction to "The Regulated Economy: A Historical Approach to Political Economy"," NBER Chapters, in: The Regulated Economy: A Historical Approach to Political Economy, pages 1-12, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Shawn Everett Kantor & Price V. Fishback, 1994. "Coalition Formation and the Adoption of Workers? Compensation: The Case of Missouri, 1911 to 1926," NBER Chapters, in: The Regulated Economy: A Historical Approach to Political Economy, pages 259-298, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Goldin, Claudia & Libecap, Gary D. (ed.), 1994. "The Regulated Economy," National Bureau of Economic Research Books, University of Chicago Press, edition 1, number 9780226301105.
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    1. Barry T. Hirsch & David A. MacPherson & J. Michael Dumond, 1997. "Workers#x0027; Compensation Recipiency in Union and Nonunion Workplaces," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 50(2), pages 213-236, January.

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    JEL classification:

    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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