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Efectos de la reducción de la jornada laboral en un modelo con dos sectores

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Abstract

En tiempos de crisis económicas, con altas tasas de paro, no debemos desconsiderar ninguna política susceptible de crear empleo. La reducción de la jornada laboral es una de ellas. La aplicación de cualquier política puede tener consecuencias distintas si se aplica en contextos diferentes. En este trabajo se estudian los efectos de la aplicación de una política de reducción de la jornada laboral en un modelo de equilibrio general con heterogeneidad en la parte de las empresas: se divide la economía en dos sectores. Las claves del modelo son la existencia de distintas productividades en las horas de trabajo para cada sector y la existencia de costes de ajuste o tiempo que dedica cada trabajador a adaptarse al puesto de trabajo al principio de la jornada. Para ello se ha construido un modelo de equilibrio general con función de emparejamiento, en el que la población se divide en dos grupos: los activos (entre los que se diferencia a los parados de los ocupados) y los inactivos. Ante la nueva jornada más reducida parte de los trabajadores inactivos deciden incorporarse a la tasa de activos. Los resultados muestran que la reducción de la jornada laboral tiene efectos más positivos sobre el empleo si se aplica en sectores con productividad más baja y con menores costes de ajuste. Los nuevos trabajadores que se incorporan a las jornadas más cortas son más productivos ya que no tienen el efecto “cansancio acumulado” y siempre y cuando el tiempo dedicado a adaptarse al puesto de trabajo no sea muy alto, las horas de trabajo de estos nuevos trabajadores serán más productivas que las últimas de las jornadas más largas.

Suggested Citation

  • Emilio Domínguez & Miren Ullibarri & Idoya Zabaleta, 2012. "Efectos de la reducción de la jornada laboral en un modelo con dos sectores," Documentos de Trabajo - Lan Gaiak Departamento de Economía - Universidad Pública de Navarra 1203, Departamento de Economía - Universidad Pública de Navarra.
  • Handle: RePEc:nav:ecupna:1203
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    General equilibrium; One; two and multisector growth models; Time allocation and labor supply; Matching models.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D50 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - General
    • O41 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - One, Two, and Multisector Growth Models
    • J22 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Time Allocation and Labor Supply
    • J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts

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