Efectos de la reducción de la jornada laboral en un modelo con dos sectores
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More about this item
Keywords
General equilibrium; One; two and multisector growth models; Time allocation and labor supply; Matching models.;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D50 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - General
- O41 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - One, Two, and Multisector Growth Models
- J22 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Time Allocation and Labor Supply
- J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
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