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On Limits to the Use of Linear Markov Strategies in Common Property Natural Resource Games

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  • GAUDET, Gérard
  • LOHOUES, Hervé

Abstract

Nous déterminons des conditions nécessaires à l’existence d’équilibres de Nash markoviens parfaits en stratégies linéaires dans des jeux différentiels modélisant l’exploitation d’une ressource naturelle en propriété commune. Nous montrons que l’existence de tels équilibres est assujettie à l’existence d’une relation précise entre les éléments essentiels du modèle, notamment la fonction d’utilité des agents et la fonction de dynamique naturelle ou de reproduction de la ressource. Ainsi, pour une fonction d’utilité donnée, seule une famille spécifique de fonctions de reproduction est compatible avec l’utilisation de stratégies markoviennes linéaires. De même, lorsque la fonction de reproduction est connue, seule une famille particulière de fonctions d’utilité permet l’utilisation de stratégies linéaires.

Suggested Citation

  • GAUDET, Gérard & LOHOUES, Hervé, 2005. "On Limits to the Use of Linear Markov Strategies in Common Property Natural Resource Games," Cahiers de recherche 19-2005, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
    • Handle: RePEc:mtl:montec:19-2005
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Fischer, Ronald D. & Mirman, Leonard J., 1992. "Strategic dynamic interaction : Fish wars," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 267-287, April.
    2. Fischer, Ronald D. & Mirman, Leonard J., 1996. "The Compleat Fish Wars: Biological and Dynamic Interactions," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 34-42, January.
    3. Dockner,Engelbert J. & Jorgensen,Steffen & Long,Ngo Van & Sorger,Gerhard, 2000. "Differential Games in Economics and Management Science," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521637329, January.
    4. David Levhari & Leonard J. Mirman, 1980. "The Great Fish War: An Example Using a Dynamic Cournot-Nash Solution," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 11(1), pages 322-334, Spring.
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    Cited by:

    1. Ngo Long, 2011. "Dynamic Games in the Economics of Natural Resources: A Survey," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 115-148, March.
    2. Agbo, Maxime, 2014. "Strategic exploitation with learning and heterogeneous beliefs," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 126-140.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    propriété commune; ressources naturelles; jeux différentiels; stratégies markoviennes linéaires;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D90 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - General
    • Q20 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - General

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