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Gains de productivité et contrôle de la recherche d'emploi

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Abstract

This article analyses the effectiveness of a system of job search monitoring system. Such a system leads the unemployed workers to reduce their wage requirements what results in a fall of the wages and in consequence of the unemployment rate. This article shows that a rise of the unemployment benefit can reduce the unemployment rate if the penalty imposed in the event of job refusal corresponds to a suppression of the allowances. However a stronger wage moderation can be problematic. This system encourages the workers indeed to accept quickly jobs that are not very productive. Because the composition of jobs also changes, total output and welfare would decrease as well. Finally, what is gained on the quantitative level is lost on the qualitative level

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  • Solenne Tanguy, 2005. "Gains de productivité et contrôle de la recherche d'emploi," Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques v06028, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1).
    • Handle: RePEc:mse:wpsorb:v06028
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Unemployment insurance; monitoring; productivity; quality of jobs;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J64 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
    • J65 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
    • J68 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Public Policy

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