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Gains de productivité et contrôle de la recherche d'emploi

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  • Solenne Tanguy

    (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

This article analyses the effectiveness of a system of job search monitoring system. Such a system leads the unemployed workers to reduce their wage requirements what results in a fall of the wages and in consequence of the unemployment rate. This article shows that a rise of the unemployment benefit can reduce the unemployment rate if the penalty imposed in the event of job refusal corresponds to a suppression of the allowances. However a stronger wage moderation can be problematic. This system encourages the workers indeed to accept quickly jobs that are not very productive. Because the composition of jobs also changes, total output and welfare would decrease as well. Finally, what is gained on the quantitative level is lost on the qualitative level.

Suggested Citation

  • Solenne Tanguy, 2005. "Gains de productivité et contrôle de la recherche d'emploi," Post-Print halshs-00113481, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00113481
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00113481
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jan Boone & Peter Fredriksson & Bertil Holmlund & Jan C. van Ours, 2007. "Optimal Unemployment Insurance with Monitoring and Sanctions," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 117(518), pages 399-421, March.
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