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The positive core for games with precedence constraints

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Abstract

We generalize the characterizations of the positive core and the positive prekernel to TU games with precedence constraints and show that the positive core is characterized by non-emptiness (NE), boundedness (BOUND), covariance under strategic equivalence, closedness (CLOS), the reduced game property (RGP), the reconfirmation property (RCP) for suitably generalized Davis-Maschler reduced games, and the possibility of nondiscrimination. The bounded positive core, i.e., the union of all bounded faces of the positive core, is characterized similarly. Just RCP has to be replaced by a suitable weaker axiom, a weak version of CRGP (the converse RGP) has to be added, and CLOS can be deleted. For classical games the prenucleolus is the unique further solution that satisfies the axioms, but for games with precedence constraints it violates NE as well as the prekernel. The positive prekernel, however, is axiomatized by NE, anonymity, reasonableness, the weak RGP, CRGP, and weak unanimity for two-person games (WUTPG), and the bounded positive prekernel is axiomatized similarly by requiring WUTPG only for classical two-person games and adding BOUND

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  • Michel Grabisch & Peter Sudhölter, 2014. "The positive core for games with precedence constraints," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 14036, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
  • Handle: RePEc:mse:cesdoc:14036
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Michel Grabisch & Peter Sudhölter, 2012. "The bounded core for games with precedence constraints," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 201(1), pages 251-264, December.
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    3. Michel Grabisch, 2011. "Ensuring the boundedness of the core of games with restricted cooperation," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 191(1), pages 137-154, November.
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    Keywords

    TU games; restricted cooperation; game with precedence constraints; positive core; bounded core; positive prekernel; prenucleolus;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games

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