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Beliefs and Endogenous Cognitive Levels: An Experimental Study

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Listed:
  • Marina Agranov
  • Elizabeth Potamites
  • Andrew Schotter
  • Chloe Tergiman

Abstract

Uses a laboratory setting to manipulate our subjectsʼ beliefs about the cognitive levels of the players they are playing against. We show that in the context of the 2/3 guessing game, individual choices crucially depend on their beliefs about the level of others.

Suggested Citation

  • Marina Agranov & Elizabeth Potamites & Andrew Schotter & Chloe Tergiman, "undated". "Beliefs and Endogenous Cognitive Levels: An Experimental Study," Mathematica Policy Research Reports 887d4d4ffd0b4ea8b2dc04d4f, Mathematica Policy Research.
    • Handle: RePEc:mpr:mprres:887d4d4ffd0b4ea8b2dc04d4f75c3628
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    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S089982561200022X
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Guessing game ; Beliefs ; Level-k theory;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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