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What the Judge Argues is Not What the Judge Thinks - Eye Tracking Evidence about the Normative Weight of Conflicting Concerns in a Torts Case

Author

Listed:
  • Christoph Engel

    (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods)

  • Rima Maria Rahal

    (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods)

Abstract

Judicial decision making is not a mechanical activity. It requires a voluntary act. In the abstract, the judge must strike a balance between incompatible normative goals, like backward looking compensation and forward looking deterrence. In the concrete, the decision-maker must weigh conflicting facets of the conflict of life. As a rule, judicial decisions come with explicit reasons. These reasons rationalize the decision. In this paper, we use eye tracking as a window into the – consciously not fully accessible – process of making the decision, testing laypersons on a run-of-the-mill torts case. We manipulate the degree of normative conflict, and either have participants decide as judges, or plead as attorneys. Against expectations, attention is not chiefly directed towards items that support the final outcome. Rather outcome is predicted by attention on potentially conflicting items. Explicit reasons and fixations on items are essentially uncorrelated. Decision-makers are not aware of the elements of the evidence that have been critical for their decision.

Suggested Citation

  • Christoph Engel & Rima Maria Rahal, 2020. "What the Judge Argues is Not What the Judge Thinks - Eye Tracking Evidence about the Normative Weight of Conflicting Concerns in a Torts Case," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2020_03, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, revised 01 Mar 2021.
  • Handle: RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2020_03
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, "undated". "Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity - Evidence and Economic Applications," IEW - Working Papers 075, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    2. Theodore Eisenberg & Christoph Engel, 2014. "Assuring Civil Damages Adequately Deter: A Public Good Experiment," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 11(2), pages 301-349, June.
    3. Theodore Eisenberg & Christoph Engel, 2016. "Unpacking Negligence Liability: Experimentally Testing the Governance Effect," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 13(1), pages 116-152, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    legal decision making; context of discovery vs. context of representation; eye tracking; balancing; torts; compensation; deterrence;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D01 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • D91 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making
    • K13 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Tort Law and Product Liability; Forensic Economics
    • K40 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - General

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