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Gain-Loss Framing in Interdependent Choice

Author

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  • Susann Fiedler

    (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods)

  • Adrian Hillenbrand

    (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods)

Abstract

Framing influences choice. However, little is known about the underlying mechanisms behind framing effects. We study gain-loss framing in binary modified dictator games. Subjects choose the selfish option more often in the loss frame compared to the gain frame. Recording visual fixations with eye-tracking, we find that dictators focus more on their own outcomes when facing losses. This suggests that losses to the own outcome are weighted more than losses to another player.

Suggested Citation

  • Susann Fiedler & Adrian Hillenbrand, 2018. "Gain-Loss Framing in Interdependent Choice," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2018_15, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
    • Handle: RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2018_15
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    Cited by:

    1. Qingzhou Sun & Haozhi Guo & Jiarui Wang & Jing Zhang & Chengming Jiang & Yongfang Liu, 2021. "Differences in cooperation between social dilemmas of gain and loss," Judgment and Decision Making, Society for Judgment and Decision Making, vol. 16(6), pages 1506-1524, November.
    2. repec:cup:judgdm:v:16:y:2021:i:6:p:1506-1524 is not listed on IDEAS

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