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The Problems of Collective Action: A New Approach

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  • Katharina Holzinger

    (Institute of Political Science, University of Hamburg, Germany)

Abstract

The problem of collective action is usually identified with social dilemmas. A wider notion of the term collective action problem is introduced, as dilemmas are not the only problems to arise in collective action. The article first presents a typology of collective action problems based on matrix game analysis. Five types are distinguished: distribution, defection, co-ordination, disagreement, and instability problems. Second, the article discusses a number of proposals how to resolve these types of collective action problems, such as altruism, norms, focal points, correlated strategies, collective decision-making, external power, and sanctioning. Whereas the "political" solutions can be used to resolve all types of problems, the "motivational" solutions can only facilitate the resolution of some of the problems, and the "rational expectation" solutions can solve some types and help to solve others.

Suggested Citation

  • Katharina Holzinger, 2003. "The Problems of Collective Action: A New Approach," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2003_2, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
    • Handle: RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2003_02
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Laurent Denant-Boemont & Olivier L’Haridon, 2013. "La rationalité à l'épreuve de l'économie comportementale," Revue française d'économie, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 0(2), pages 35-89.
    2. Priddat, Birger P., 2008. "Öffentliche Güter als politische Güter," ZögU - Zeitschrift für öffentliche und gemeinwirtschaftliche Unternehmen, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG, vol. 31(2), pages 152-173.

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