IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/mit/worpap/93-6.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for the Perfect Finite Horizon Folk Theorem

Author

Listed:
  • Smith, L.

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Smith, L., 1993. "Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for the Perfect Finite Horizon Folk Theorem," Working papers 93-6, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:mit:worpap:93-6
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Ghislain-Herman Demeze-Jouatsa, 2020. "A complete folk theorem for finitely repeated games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 49(4), pages 1129-1142, December.
    2. Contou-Carrère, Pauline & Tomala, Tristan, 2011. "Finitely repeated games with semi-standard monitoring," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 14-21, January.
    3. Pablo Casas-Arce, 2004. "Layoffs and Quits in Repeated Games," Economics Series Working Papers 199, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    4. Jean-Pierre Benoît & Vijay Krishna, 1996. "The Folk Theorems for Repeated Games - A Synthesis," Discussion Papers 96-03, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
    5. repec:kbb:dpaper:2011-44 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Demeze-Jouatsa, Ghislain-Herman, 2018. "A note on ”Necessary and sufficient conditions for the perfect finite horizon folk theorem” [Econometrica, 63 (2): 425-430, 1995.]," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 583, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    7. Pablo Casas-Arce, 2010. "Dismissals and quits in repeated games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 43(1), pages 67-80, April.
    8. Chen, Bo & Takahashi, Satoru, 2012. "A folk theorem for repeated games with unequal discounting," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 571-581.
    9. Marlats, Chantal, 2019. "Perturbed finitely repeated games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 39-46.
    10. Miyahara, Yasuyuki & Sekiguchi, Tadashi, 2013. "Finitely repeated games with monitoring options," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(5), pages 1929-1952.
    11. Demeze-Jouatsa, Ghislain-Herman, 2018. "A complete folk theorem for finitely repeated games," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 584, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    12. Chantal Marlats, 2015. "A Folk theorem for stochastic games with finite horizon," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 58(3), pages 485-507, April.
    13. Gonzalez-Diaz, Julio, 2006. "Finitely repeated games: A generalized Nash folk theorem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 100-111, April.
    14. Yasuyuki Miyahara & Tadashi Sekiguchi, 2016. "Finitely Repeated Games with Automatic and Optional Monitoring," Discussion Papers 2016-12, Kobe University, Graduate School of Business Administration.
    15. Sekiguchi, Tadashi, 2002. "Existence of nontrivial equilibria in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 299-321, August.
    16. Bo Chen & Satoru Fujishige, 2013. "On the feasible payoff set of two-player repeated games with unequal discounting," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 42(1), pages 295-303, February.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    mathematics ; economic models;

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mit:worpap:93-6. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Linda Woodbury (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/edmitus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.