Evidence-based threat-of-audit letters: do taxpayers respond strategically in a complex environment?
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More about this item
Keywords
Tax Compliance by Businesses; Threat-of-audit letters;JEL classification:
- H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
- C55 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric Modeling - - - Large Data Sets: Modeling and Analysis
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-ACC-2017-10-01 (Accounting and Auditing)
- NEP-EUR-2017-10-01 (Microeconomic European Issues)
- NEP-IUE-2017-10-01 (Informal and Underground Economics)
- NEP-ORE-2017-10-01 (Operations Research)
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